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Letter dated 23 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the unified command established pursuant to Security Council resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950, I have the honour to submit a special report to the Security Council prepared by the United Nations Command on the special investigation of the sinking of the Republic of Korea ship *Cheonan* (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter, together with its annex, could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Susan E. **Rice**

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Annex to the letter dated 23 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Special investigation of the sinking of the Republic of Korea ship *Cheonan*

1. General

On 26 March 2010, the Republic of Korea ship *Cheonan* (PCC 772) (hereafter the *Cheonan*) was sunk at or near the island of Paengyong-Do (PY-Do). On 20 May 2010, a Republic of Korea-led multinational civil-military investigation completed its near two-month investigation of the incident implicating north Korean military involvement in the sinking. Acting under article II, para. 27, of the Korean War Armistice Agreement of 1953 (AA), and section VII, paragraph 51, of UNC Regulation 551-4 (Compliance with the Armistice Agreement), the United Nations Command (UNC) Senior Member of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) directed the UNCMAC Secretary to establish a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to ascertain all facts concerning the incident and assess whether the AA was violated (enclosure 1).[1] Per UNC Senior Member request, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) composed of three different sections, observed the conduct of the SIT during its investigation (enclosure 2[1]). The multinational composition of the SIT, composed of nine different nations, and its mission and task organization is reflected at enclosure 3.[1] Information contained in this investigative report was obtained from a series of both classified and unclassified reports, briefings and documents from the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defence (MND) Civil-Military Joint Investigation Group (JIG), United States investigative teams to the JIG, UNC documents and various open source materials. A listing of the reference material and applicable portions thereof are at enclosure 4.[1]

2. Findings of fact

Clear and convincing evidence[2] supports the following:

a. Applicable AA and UNC Regulation 551-4 provisions

1) The Korean People's Army (KPA) agreed on 27 July 1953 to "accept and to be bound by the conditions and terms of" the AA [Preamble, Ref (a)][3]

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[1] Not included in the present document. The enclosure contains the report of NNSC on its observation of the investigation.

[2] To be clear and convincing, evidence must leave no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion in the mind of objective persons, after considering all the facts. It is a higher degree than a preponderance of the evidence standard, but it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Para. 0214 JAGINST 5800 7E W/CH2].

[3] See also International Agreement between the Republic of Korea and north Korea on "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North", dated 13 December 1991 (in which both parties agreed at Article 5 to "abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement (of July 27, 1953) until such time as a state of peace has taken hold").

2) The AA's stated objective is to "establish an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved." [Preamble, Ref (a)]

3) The AA obligates the opposing sides to "order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces." [Paras. 12 and 17, Ref (a)]

4) The AA placed the island of "Paengyong-Do" under the military control of Commander-in-Chief (now Commander), UNC. [Para. 13b, Ref (a)]

5) The AA applies to "all opposing naval forces" and requires such naval forces to "respect the waters contiguous to the land of Korea under the military control of the opposing side." [Para. 15, Ref (a)]

6) The AA requires the opposing sides to "observe both the letter and the spirit of all the provisions of" the AA. [Para. 17, Ref (a)]

7) The AA "shall remain in effect until by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides." [Para. 62, Ref (a)][4]

8) The UNC regulation on compliance with the AA defines an AA violation as "an action taken by any party to the [AA] that violates any provisions thereof, or violates the clearly understood spirit and intent pertaining to any provisions thereof" and then defines classification of AA violations as either "major" or "minor" while providing a non-exhaustive list of examples of such [Paras. 44-46, Ref (b)]

a) The intrusion into waters contiguous to the land area of the opposing side constitutes a major violation of the AA. [Para. 45, Ref (b)][5]

b) The firing of weapons into the territory under control of the opposing side constitutes a major violation of the AA. [Para. 45.b, Ref (b)]

c) The intrusion of armed vessels of the opposing side into waters contiguous to the land area of Korea of the opposing side constitutes a major violation of the AA. [Para. 45.d, Ref (b)]

d) A firefight or other combat between KPA/Chinese People's Volunteers and UNC personnel, ships or aircraft constitutes a major violation of the AA. [Para. 45.f, Ref (b)]

b. Events surrounding sinking

1) On 26 March 2010 at or about 2100, the *Cheonan* was conducting a routine patrol in an assigned sector in the vicinity of PY-Do on a course and speed

[4] This provision is supported by United Nations Security Council action in 1996 when the Council made its most definitive statement on the status of UNC since its original resolutions of the 1950s. The President of the Council made a statement on behalf of the Council regarding an incident in which a north Korean submarine foundered on the Republic of Korea coast, "urg[ing] that the Korean Armistice Agreement should be fully observed" and "stress[ed] that the Armistice Agreement shall remain in force until it is replaced by a new peace mechanism" (S/PRST/1996/42, dated 15 October 1996).

[5] The AA does not define or otherwise elaborate on the meaning of "water contiguous to" a land area. Any evaluation of such must rely upon a totality of the circumstances.

of 327° and 6.5 kts respectively [Pg 1 & Pg 241, Ref (q), Ref (c); see also Pg 9-1, Ref (d)]

2) The maritime weather on 26 March 2010 had a visibility of 2.5 nm, sunset at 1859, moonset at 0356, an 82 per cent illumination, and sea states of 3 m. [Pg 225, Ref (q); see also Ref (e), Pg 9-1, Ref (d)]

3) As there were no other incidents of hostilities or acts of armed force on 26 March 2010, the *Cheonan* crew was not manning firing positions or conducting any battle drills. [Pg 2, Ref (q); see also Ref (c), Ref (m)]

4) Given the environmental conditions at 2122 on 26 March 2010 and the state of passive sonar, the *Cheonan* did not detect any enemy contacts in its patrol area. [Pg e & Pgs 1-2, Ref (q), Ref (c); Ref (g)]

5) No other friendly vessels were in the vicinity of the *Cheonan* while it patrolled, as the closest friendly vessel was the Republic of Korea Ship *Sokcho* (hereafter the *Sokcho*) patrolling their sector almost 26.5 nm away. [Ref (c); Pg 9-1, Ref (f); see also Ref (d)]

6) At 2122, without warning, the *Cheonan* was hit by an explosion 1.59 nm SW of Py-Do (37°55'45"N 124°36'02"E), which resulted in her almost immediate sinking and loss of 46 Republic of Korea sailors. [Pgs a-e & Pgs 1-4, Pgs 241-241, Ref (q); see also Pg 1, Ref (g), Pg 9-1, Ref (d)]

7) A Republic of Korea sentry on the shore of PY-Do stated that he witnessed an approximate 100 m high "pillar of white flash" for 2 to 3 seconds at the approximate time of the explosion — demonstrating his ability to see the incident location from PY-Do. [Pg b, Ref (q), Pg 3, Ref (h)]

8) Seismic and infrasound sensors along PY-Do at the time of incident were able to track impulse curves from the explosion. [Pg b, Ref (q), Pg 3, Ref (h); Pg 84-86, Ref (i); see also Ref (m)]

9) The *Sokcho* was immediately dispatched at 2131 to respond to the sinking of the *Cheonan* and arrived on scene at approximately 2255. [Ref (q), Ref (c), Ref (f); see also Ref (m)]

10) On arrival to the scene at 2255, the *Sokcho* identified a positive radar contact within the *Cheonan* patrol box tracking at 018° and 42 kts. [Ref (c); Ref (f); Ref (p)]

11) At 2259, on the recommendation of the Captain of the *Sokcho* and on the order of the Second Republic of Korea Fleet Commander, the *Sokcho* initiated two warning shots with their 76-mm gun to its positive radar contact tracking at 35° and 40 kts and then initiated 133 rounds of direct fire with its 76-mm gun at 2301 at the positive radar contact tracking at 15° and 43 kts — lasting 4 mins., 33 secs. [Ref (c); Ref (f); Ref (p)]

12) Following the engagement, the positive radar contact was determined to be birdlife. [Ref (c); Ref (p)]

13) At no time did the *Sokcho* engage an opposing force or intrude upon waters contiguous to any land area of Korea under the military control of the KPA. [Ref (c); Ref (f); Ref (p)]

c. Subsequent investigation

1) The Republic of Korea MND established its JIG on or about 31 March 2010 to ascertain the cause of the sinking of the *Cheonan* through scientific and objectively precise investigative means. [Pg 4, Ref (q), Slides 3-5, Ref (j)]

2) The JIG was composed of 25 experts from 10 Republic of Korea agencies, 22 Republic of Korea military experts, and 24 multinational experts constituting 4 support teams from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Canada, and was divided into 4 separate teams — Scientific Investigation Team, Explosive Analysis Team, Ship Structure Management Team and Intelligence Analysis Team. While not cited or included in the JIG operations brief or press release numbers relative to the composition of the JIG, New Zealand did participate as a member of the Multinational Combined Intelligence Task Force under the JIG. [Pg a, Ref (q), Pgs 1 and 5, Ref (h); Slides 3-5, Ref (j)]

3) The Republic of Korea Government quickly initiated salvage operations to recover the segments of the hull of the *Cheonan* from the seabed, recovering the stern on 15 April 2010 (37°55'40"N 124°36'05"E), the bow on 24 April 2010 (37°54'22"N 124°41'01"E) and having completed salvage operations on or about 20 May 2010 [Pgs 8-9, Ref (q), Ref (g); Ref (k); Ref (l)]

4) Analysis of the recovered portions of the *Cheonan* began almost immediately upon recovery of the hull and continued through publication of the JIG's report on 10 June 2010. [Ref (q), Ref (g); Slides 10-13, Ref (j)]

5) Early analysis based on results of visual inspection of the salvage hull and interior as well as various modelling and scientific methodologies from various sources quickly identified 15 possible causes that could have resulted in the sinking of the *Cheonan* (gun magazine(s) explosion; fuel tank explosion; catastrophic diesel engine failure/conflagration; catastrophic gas turbine engine failure/conflagration; bottom mine; moored influence mine; contact mine; under keel torpedo; contact torpedo; surface explosion; ballistic contact; improvised explosive device (IED)/non-contact mine; hogging/sagging/welding failure/material fatigue failure; grounding; and collision with submarine or other object); however, 13 were ruled out and focus shifted to an external underwater explosion (moored influence mine and under keel torpedo). [Ref (q), Slides 2, 21 and 25, Ref (g); Ref (k); Ref (l)]

6) Starting on 10 May 2010, the JIG initiated a recovery operation that involved two trawlers equipped with a special net to try to recover critical evidence around the point of the explosion, eventually leading to the recovery of torpedo parts at approximately 0925 on 15 May 2010 from the seabed (37°55'45"N 124°36'02"E) near the explosion point that included a distinctly unique 5x5 bladed contra-rotating propeller set, a propulsion motor and a steering section. [Pgs c-d, Ref (q), Slides 3-8, Ref (g); Pg 6, Ref (h); Slides 10-38, Ref (j); see also Ref (m) and Ref (n)]

a) The torpedo evidence matched in size and shape the specifications on drawings presented in introductory materials provided to foreign countries by north Korea relative to a north Korean-made CHT-02D torpedo available for export and possessing a net explosive weight of up to 250 kg and acoustic/wake homing and passive acoustic tracking capability. [Pgs c-e & Pgs 232-240, Pg 4-7 (Ref (h)]

b) The Hangul marking on the torpedo evidence was consistent with marking of a previously obtained north Korean torpedo. [Pg 6, Pg 238, Ref (q), Pg 4, Ref (h)]

c) The physical condition of the torpedo evidence, including marine growth and corrosion, is consistent with that of a weapon that would have caused the sinking and had been exposed to the environmental elements for the period of time between the sinking and the recovery of the torpedo remains. [Pg 239, Ref (q), Pg 4, Ref (h); Ref (e); see also Ref (m)]

d) The north Korean military is known to be in possession of a fleet of various submarines and torpedoes of various capabilities including acoustic/wake homing torpedoes with a net explosive weight of about 200 to 300 kg — which can deliver the same level of damage that was discovered to the *Cheonan* hull. [Pgs d-e, Ref (q), Ref (e); Ref (e); Pg 5-7, Ref (h); see also Ref (d) and Ref (m)]

e) It was confirmed that a few small north Korean submarines and a mother ship supporting them left a north Korean naval base in the West Sea 2 to 3 days prior to the attack and returned to port 2 to 3 days after the attack, and that all submarines from neighbouring countries were either in or near their respective home bases at the time of the incident. [Pgs d-e, Ref (q), Ref (e); Pg 9-5; Pg 6, Ref (h); see also Ref (d), Ref (m) and Ref (n)]

7) After nearly 2 months of investigation and multiple interim press releases on status, the JIG announced its findings on 20 May 2010. [Pg a, Ref (q), Slides 5-9, Ref (g); Page 1, Ref (h)]

a) The JIG concluded a strong underwater explosion generated by the detonation of a homing torpedo (with a net explosive weight of between 200 and 300 kg) below and to the left of the gas turbine room caused the *Cheonan* to split apart and sink. [Pg e & Pg 243, Ref (q), Slides 10-40, Ref (j); Pg 1, 4-6, Ref (h); Ref (g)]

b) The JIG concluded, based on all such relevant facts and classified analysis and the lack of any other plausible explanation, that the *Cheonan* was sunk as the result of an external underwater explosion caused by a torpedo made in north Korea and that the evidence pointed overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a north Korean submarine. [Pg e, Ref (q), Pg 7, Ref (h); see also Ref (d), Ref (m) and Ref (n)]

8) The probable firing position of the north Korean submarine utilizing a CHT-02D torpedo is within 2 to 3 nm from PY-Do. [Ref (e); see also Ref (d) and Ref (m)]

9) No other plausible or compelling (i.e., reasonable) alternatives to a north Korean submarine armed attack against the *Cheonan* can be identified from the evidence. [Pgs a-e, Ref (q), Pg 7, Ref (h); see also Ref (d), Ref (m) and Ref (n)]

10) No other nation's submarines were capable of sinking the *Cheonan* when considering location, time, space and capability. [Pg e, Ref (q), Pg 6, Ref (h); see also Pg 9-2, Ref (d), Ref (m) and Ref (n)]

11) North Korean military forces were the only forces capable of sinking the *Cheonan* when considering the capability and pattern of activity of its submarines and other supporting capabilities and assets at the time of the attack and in the

months prior to the attack. [Pgs c-d, Ref (q), Pg 5-7, Ref (h); see also Pg 9-2, 9-5, 9-7 and 9-8, Ref (d), Ref (m) and Ref (n)]

3. Opinions

Although the SIT applied the clear and convincing standard in conducting its assessment, our conclusion is that the evidence is so overwhelming as to meet the higher standard of beyond reasonable doubt[6] for the following:

a. The Republic of Korea JIG and Second Republic of Korea Fleet briefings and reports and the United States investigative teams' briefings and reports are credible and objective materials. [FF a-c; Ref (c)-(l) and Ref (o)-(p)]

b. The *Cheonan* was sunk as a result of a hostile act and an act of armed force in Korea. [FF b-c]

c. The sinking of the *Cheonan* occurred in waters contiguous to a land area of Korea under the military control of the Commander, UNC. [FF b-c]

d. The sinking of the *Cheonan* was the result of north Korea's KPA military forces' deliberate and premeditated action. [FF b-c]

e. The KPA's failure to order or enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, specifically their naval forces, constitutes a violation of the AA. [FF a-c]

f. The KPA's failure to respect the waters contiguous to the island of PY-Do, a land area of Korea under the military control of the Commander, UNC, constitutes a violation of the AA. [FF a-c]

g. The KPA military's armed intrusion and/or firing of a torpedo into the waters contiguous to the island of PY-Do, a land area of Korea under the military control the Commander, UNC, constitutes a violation of the AA. [FF a-c]

h. The KPA military's deliberate and premeditated armed attack and sinking of the *Cheonan*, resulting in the death of 46 Republic of Korea sailors, constitutes a violation of the AA. [FF a-c]

i. The KPA military's armed attack and sinking of the *Cheonan* also constitutes a violation of the spirit and intent of the AA. [FF a-c]

j. The KPA's actions in failing to order or enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea, failing to respect the waters contiguous to the island of PY-Do, making an armed intrusion and/or firing of a torpedo into the waters contiguous to the island of PY-Do, and their deliberate and premeditated armed attack and sinking of the *Cheonan*, resulting in the death of 46 Republic of Korea

[6] See for example, Para 2-5-12, DA Pamphlet 27-9 ("A 'reasonable doubt' is not a fanciful or ingenious doubt or conjecture, but an honest, conscientious doubt suggested by the material evidence or lack of it in the case. It is an honest misgiving generated by insufficiency of proof of guilt. 'Proof beyond a reasonable doubt' means proof to an evidentiary certainty, although not necessarily to an absolute or mathematical certainty. The proof must be such as to exclude not every hypothesis or possibility of innocence, but every fair and rational hypothesis except that of guilt.").

sailors, constitute major violations of the AA per UNC regulation on compliance with the AA, reference (b). [FF a-c]

k. The *Sokcho*'s actions in response to the sinking of the *Cheonan* were not in violation of either the letter or the spirit of all the provisions of the AA.[7] [FF a, c]

4. Recommendations

a. No further UNC investigation warranted.

b. Report SIT findings to the United Nations Security Council.[8]

c. Request General Officer-level talks with the KPA in order to open dialogue with the KPA relative to the *Cheonan* sinking.[9]

d. Request the KPA to facilitate the dispatch of a Joint Observation Team per the terms of paragraph 27 of the AA in order to investigate these violations of the AA and facilitate the MAC's settlement through negotiations of these violations of the AA.[10]

e. Request the Chinese People's Volunteers[11] to return to the MAC in order to facilitate the MAC's settlement through negotiation of these violations of the AA.

f. Consistent with paragraph 60 of the AA, recommend to the governments of the countries concerned that an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level be reached.

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[7] No opinion was formulated as to *Sokcho* actions relative to the UNC/CFC Armistice Rules of Engagement, with Changes 1-3, dated 29 April 96, as that was viewed outside the purview of this SIT.

[8] Security Council resolution 84 (1950) "requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate" and Security Council resolution 85 (1950) "requests the Unified Command to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate".

[9] General Officer-level talks are a means of dialogue between the UNC and KPA outside the context of the MAC as the KPA has refused to participate in the MAC since the Commander, UNC appointed a Republic of Korea officer as the UNC Senior Member in April 1994.

[10] The KPA communicated at 1100 on 20 May 2010 to the Republic of Korea Minister of National Defence, not UNC, intent to send a KPA "inspection group" to the Republic of Korea in order to "inspect and confirm the evidence" regarding the sinking of the *Cheonan*. Republic of Korea MND responded to the KPA on 21 May 2010 indicating the matter would "be handled under the [AA] maintenance system" and the KPA would "have to respond faithfully" to such. The KPA at 0956 on 22 May 2010 responded by indicating this was a "North-South issue," "that there is no justification at all to involve the [MAC] which has become nothing more than a name" and that it desired to be presented "material evidence" demonstrating their involvement in the sinking "with no shred of doubt".

[11] This is supported by China's prior involvement in the MAC before 1994 and Security Council resolution 88 (1950), dated 8 November 1950 (inviting the People's Republic of China to Security Council discussions of the Korean question); General Assembly resolution 498 (V), dated 1 February 1951 (finding the People's Republic of China had "itself engaged in aggression in Korea"); and General Assembly resolution 711 (VII), dated 28 August 1953 (recommending that the United States, north Korea, the People's Republic of China, Russia, the 15 other United Nations Member States contributing forces to the unified command, and the Republic of Korea participate in a peace conference).

5. Point of contact

Point of contact is Major Sean Miller, UNCMAC ASEC-O (sean.d.miller2@korea.army.mil) at 724-7309.

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As observed by:
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(*Signed*) B. PIDANTY
Lieutenant Colonel, Polish Army
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(*Signed*) M. EHRENSPERGER
Major, Swiss Army
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Enclosure

To:

Major General Yoon Young Bum
Senior Member
UNCMAC

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission report on the special investigation of the sinking of the Republic of Korea ship *Cheonan*

References

This NNSC report is based on the following documents:

Ref (a): Armistice Agreement, 27 July 1953

Ref (b): NNSC Expanded Tasks 2007

Ref (c): Letter of request to NNSC by Senior Member UNCMAC, 24 May 2010

Ref (d): Commander UNC Report 27 May 2010, Special investigation of the sinking of the Republic of Korea Ship *Cheonan*

Ref (e): US Department of the Navy, JAG instructions 5800.7E CH-2, 16 September 2008

Ref (f): US Department of the Army, pamphlet 27-9, paragraph 2-5-12, 1 January 2010

Orientation

In accordance with paragraph 28 of the Armistice Agreement (AA; ref a) and the decision on Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) Expanded Tasks 2007 (ref b), the NNSC Delegates accompanied the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) Special Investigation Team (SIT) in order to observe the investigation. The NNSC is requested to provide a separate report to the Senior Member (ref c). The NNSC also submits this report to their respective national authorities.

The purpose of the UNCMAC investigation was to ascertain all facts concerning Republic of Korea ship *Cheonan* sinking in waters contiguous to Paengyong-Do (PY-Do) in order to determine if the Armistice Agreement was violated and report the results to the Commander UNC. The SIT team consisted of UNC representatives from Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The United States Member of UNMAC supervised the execution of this SIT.

A comprehensive, unclassified official report has been submitted to the Commander UNC (ref d). UNCMAC's conclusion is that the incident was a

violation of the AA, stating that the Korean People's Army (KPA) has beyond a reasonable doubt[a] launched a torpedo against the *Cheonan* on 26 March 2010.

NNSC Mission

NNSC was requested by the UNCMAC Senior Member to observe the special investigation of the Republic of Korea ship *Cheonan* sinking (ref e).

SIT set up and NNSC involvement

Three NNSC Delegates, Colonel Johan Eneroth from Sweden, Lieutenant Colonel Bogdan Pidanty from Poland and Major Marc Ehrensperger from Switzerland, accompanied UNCMAC on the SIT, which was conducted from 21 until 27 May 2010.

The NNSC Delegates observed all steps of the investigation conducted by UNCMAC, and NNSC was given the opportunity to participate in all sessions, briefings, interviews and on-site visits, except for the intelligence briefing.[b]

During the observation the NNSC has, among other things, examined transparency regarding sources, facts, figures and execution.

The SIT was divided into two working groups; one group, with the Polish and Swiss NNSC Delegates, handled operational issues providing answers to the three following questions:

1. Was the *Cheonan* sinking a result of a hostile act or an act of armed force in Korea? (Grounding, mine, torpedo, internal explosion, structure failure, etc.)

2. If there was such an act, did the act occur in waters contiguous to a land area of Korea under the military control of the Commander UNC? In waters continuous to PY-Do?

3. Was the *Cheonan* engaged in conduct that would lead an opposing force to act in self-defence? (Orienting weapons, threatening broadcasts, etc.)

[a] The SIT has used different US Armed Forces standards of proof in order to describe the level of probability that the *Cheonan* was sunk by KPA. These levels are, from the lowest to the highest:
(1) "Findings of facts only if supported by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e., more likely than not" (ref e).
(2) "Facts asserted as highly probable and to be clear and convincing; evidence must leave no serious or substantial doubt", "it is a higher degree than a preponderance of the evidence standard, but it does require proof beyond a reasonable doubt" (ref e).
(3) "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, means proof to an evidentiary certainty, although not necessarily to an absolute or mathematical certainty" (ref f).

[b] SIT Team Leader briefings, meetings in full session with all SIT participants, visit to the *Cheonan*, Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defence briefing and demonstration of physical torpedo evidence, Joint Investigation Group operational briefing, interview with Second Fleet commander (only Swedish NNSC Delegate), additional intelligence updates. The NNSC Delegates were not allowed to participate during the intelligence briefing. The Swedish representative was provided a scrubbed version of the intelligence briefing and the Polish and Swiss representatives obtained a separable briefing with selected intelligence presented.

The other group handled intelligence issues providing answers to the two following questions:

4: If there was such an act, was it the result of KPA forces? (Yes. No. Undetermined, Probable)

5: Was the subsequent responding action of the Republic of Korea Navy a violation of the AA?

The Swedish representative participated in this group, since a higher disclosure arrangement is in place allowing more detailed intelligence being disclosed.

The sixth question was answered by the entire SIT:

6: Was there a violation of the AA?

NNSC observations

The NSSC Delegates observed that the SIT was:

- conducted with a high level of transparency, except for parts of the intelligence material;
- conducted in a professional manner using relevant facts;
- objective, fact-oriented and accurate;
- based on multiple independent and reliable sources.

NNSC conclusions

The NNSC concludes that:

- based on the information made available to the NNSC, we conclude that the AA was violated in conjunction with the sinking of the *Cheonan*.
- the NNSC supports the recommendations of the SIT (ref d).
- the SIT was executed in a comprehensive and professional manner.
- the SIT has been executed in a sufficiently transparent manner, however improvements should be made regarding access to classified material.
- the SIT in itself was not violation of the AA.

NNSC recommendations

The NNSC recommends that:

- the SIT report and this NNSC report should be submitted to the United Nations Security Council.
- the Commander UNC should invite the Korean People's Army (KPA) and the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) to pursue the investigation of the *Cheonan* incident within the AA framework.
- the Commander UNC should request the KPA and the CPLA as a successor to the Chinese People's Volunteers, to return to the Military Armistice

Commission (MAC) in order to facilitate the MAC's settlement, through negotiations, of these violations of the AA.

- the Commander UNC should recommend to the Governments of the countries concerned to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the conflict at the political level.

- in order to reach a sufficient level of transparency, a system should be put in place ensuring NNSC to have access to classified information at the same level as the troop sending nations, as required.

(*Signed*) Christer **Lidstrom**	(*Signed*) Jean-Jacques **Joss**	(*Signed*) Anatol **Wojtan**
Major General	Major General	Major General
Swedish Member to the NNSC	Swiss Member to the NNSC	Polish Member to the NNSC

Mailing List

To:

- Senior Member UNCMAC
- Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm
- Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Berne
- Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw

Copy to:

- Swedish Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (H.E. Lars Vargo)
- Swiss Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (H.E. Thomas Kupfer)
- Polish Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (H.E. Marek Calka)
- DCS UNC (Major General Lawrence Wells)
- Secretary UNCMAC (Colonel Kurt Taylor)
- Swedish Delegation to NNSC
- Swiss Delegation to NNSC
- Polish Delegation to NNSC

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Security Council

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Letter dated 20 July 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Gabon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith attached a report on the work of the Security Council during the presidency of Gabon in March 2010 (see annex). The document was prepared under the responsibility of Ambassador Issoze-Ngondet, following consultation with other members of the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alfred **Moungara Moutsotsi**
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

10-46391 (E) 110810

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Annex to the letter dated 20 July 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Gabon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Assessment of the work of the Security Council during the presidency of Gabon (March 2010)

Under the presidency of Gabon, in March 2010, the Security Council considered international and regional issues and one thematic issue. It held 22 official meetings, 1 informal meeting on 22 March, on the future of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), and 1 closed meeting with countries contributing troops to that Mission.

The Council adopted five resolutions (on Afghanistan, Somalia, MINURCAT, and the election of judges to the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) and one presidential statement (following the thematic debate of 19 March) and issued statements to the press (on Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire).

I. Regional issues

Africa

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Council met on 5 and 18 March to consider the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, more especially, the future of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

The Council was informed by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, of the Congolese authorities' decision that MONUC should begin its "gradual disengagement" as from the end of June 2010 until 2011. Under these circumstances, the Council will send a mission to that country to undertake consultations with the Congolese authorities on the issue.

Guinea-Bissau

On 5 March, the Council considered the report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacekeeping Office in that country (UNIOGBIS) (S/2010/106), introduced by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNIOGBIS, Joseph Mutaboba.

During the meeting, the Permanent Representative of Guinea-Bissau, Alfredo L. Cabral, and the Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, Maria Luiza R. Viotti, also took the floor.

The Council took note of political and social developments in the past few months and welcomed the fiscal and administrative reforms initiated by the Government. The Council encouraged the Government of Guinea-Bissau to step up its efforts to combat drug trafficking. Lastly, it invited the international community, including States in the subregion, to continue to support the action of the Government of Guinea-Bissau.

After consultations, the members of the Council issued a statement to the press, in which they welcomed the progress made by the Government of Guinea-Bissau on its stabilization and reform agenda and the launching by the National Assembly of a process for reconciliation and dialogue. The members stressed the critical importance of the President, Government, political leaders, armed forces and people of Guinea-Bissau continuing to meet their responsibilities to work towards national reconciliation, maintain stability and constitutional order, and respect the rule of law.

The members of the Council also reaffirmed that security sector reform remained critical to peace and development in Guinea-Bissau and expressed their support for the efforts undertaken in particular by the United Nations, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the European Union, and underlined the need for UNIOGBIS, in collaboration with all relevant partners, to continue to coordinate international assistance in this area.

Finally, the members of the Council welcomed the continued engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission and encouraged it to assist the Government of Guinea-Bissau in mobilizing the support and resources needed to consolidate peace and security, as well as promote sustainable development in accordance with the national priorities elaborated in the Peacebuilding Strategic Framework for Guinea-Bissau.

Chad/Central African Republic

The Council met on 5, 12 and 22 March to discuss the future of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad following the indication by the Government of Chad that it preferred not to renew the Mission's mandate.

On 12 March, the Council adopted resolution 1913 (2010), extending the mandate of MINURCAT until 15 May 2010 to facilitate further discussion between the United Nations and the Government of Chad. The Council expressed concern that the withdrawal of MINURCAT was premature and could diminish the security situation of refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as increase the difficulty of providing humanitarian services.

Liberia

The Council met on 10 March to consider the situation in Liberia and heard a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ellen Margrethe Loj.

The Council welcomed the development of the process of national reconciliation and encouraged the Liberian authorities to continue economic reforms. The Council also welcomed the assistance given by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Government in preparing the electoral process and strengthening security. Lastly, the Council took note of the wish expressed by the Government for the gradual reduction of UNMIL by 2011 and for Liberia to be eligible for membership in the Peacebuilding Commission.

Sudan

On 11 March, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations briefed the Council on the situation in the Sudan on the eve of the national elections scheduled from 11 to 13 April 2010.

Despite the progress made in recent weeks, particularly in voter registration, the security situation remained no less fragile and many challenges still needed to be addressed, including:

- Voter registration of displaced persons (some 2.5 million persons) living in camps. Only 10 per cent of them were registered as voters.
- Boycotting of the electoral process by certain rebel groups.
- Abrogation of certain national laws, such as laws on the state of emergency, the press or national security, which impede the full exercise of public freedoms and campaign activities.

The Council, while supporting the full implementation of the various peace agreements in Darfur, in particular the Framework Agreement, signed at Doha on 23 February 2010, between the Government and the Movement for Justice and Equity, reaffirmed its firm support for the Joint African Union-United Nations Mediator, Djibril Bassolé.

Somalia

The Chairman of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea and Permanent Representative of Mexico, Claude Heller, gave his regular 120-day briefing to the members of the Council in closed consultations on 16 March. In his briefing, he referred to the report to the Committee of the Monitoring Group on Somalia (S/2010/91), which had noted a number of irregularities, particularly in regard to the diversion of food aid.

On 19 March, the Council adopted resolution 1916 (2010), by which it extended the mandate of the Monitoring Group referred to in paragraph 3 of resolution 1558 (2004), and requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Monitoring Group for a period of 12 months.

Côte d'Ivoire

The Council met on 17 March to consider the situation in Côte d'Ivoire. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Choi Young-Jin, and the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire, Ilahiri A. Djédjé, briefed the Council in turn on the political situation in that country.

In his briefing, the Special Representative said that the political impasse that had started in Côte d'Ivoire early in January 2010, in the wake of misunderstandings surrounding the electoral list, had delayed the preparation of the elections. He regretted the delay, as the list established in November 2009 had been considered reliable.

Ambassador Djédjé said that the crisis in February had been caused by the Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission fraudulently registering more than 429,000 people. Priority had to be given to compiling a reliable electoral list in order to organize clean and credible elections.

The Council expressed its concern about the political and social crisis that had occurred on 12 February 2010, following President Gbagbo's dissolution of the

Government and of the Independent Electoral Commission. The Council also expressed concern about the repeated postponements of elections. It invited the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to set a precise date for the holding of the elections.

After consultations, members of the Council issued a statement to the press in which they expressed their concern at the continuing delays in the electoral process since January 2010. They urged the Ivorian stakeholders to revive that process without delay and to remain within the framework of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement and of the previous peace agreements endorsed by the Security Council.

Sierra Leone

At a meeting of the Council on 22 March, the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (S/2010/135) was introduced by his Executive Representative, Michael von der Schulenburg. He spoke about youth unemployment, illicit drug trafficking, corruption and the 2012 presidential, legislative and local elections.

The Council welcomed the measures taken by the Government with the assistance of international partners to reduce youth unemployment and combat drug trafficking, cross-border crime, illegal fishing and piracy. It referred lastly to the holding of the presidential, legislative and local elections in 2012 and stressed the need for a prior dialogue between the various parties.

Asia

Islamic Republic of Iran

On 4 March, the Council heard a briefing given by the Permanent Representative of Japan, Yukio Takasu, in his capacity as the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) on the implementation of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. He reported to the Council information that the Committee had received from a State Member of the United Nations concerning the delivery of material intended for use in the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, Islamic Republic of Iran, and the unfreezing of funds for the payment of contracts between the Islamic Republic of Iran and a third State.

Following the briefing, some Council members condemned those violations and invited the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and to increase its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to dispel doubts as to the purpose of its nuclear programme.

Afghanistan

At a meeting of the Council on 18 March, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations introduced the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan (S/2010/127).

The Under-Secretary-General said that the consensus that had arisen a year before on the need to transform the relationship between Afghanistan and its international partners through a transfer of responsibilities to the Afghans and a supporting role for the international community had emerged clearly at the London Conference on Afghanistan. He hoped that the international community would take

concrete steps to allow Afghans to be in charge of the fate of their country. Referring to the parliamentary elections to be held in Afghanistan in September, the Under-Secretary-General said that they could be another milestone in highlighting the primacy of the constitutional imperative in leading Afghanistan's future. In terms of the economy, he said that assistance efforts must be coordinated.

The Council welcomed the consensus that had been reached following the London Conference of 28 January 2010. The Council took note of the decision of the Conference to open a new chapter in the partnership between the Government of Afghanistan and the international community in order to increase the responsibility of the Afghans for managing their security and development.

On 22 March, the Council, by its resolution 1917 (2010), extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan until 23 March 2011.

Situation in Myanmar

On 23 March, the Council held informal consultations on the political situation in Myanmar.

On that occasion, the Chef de Cabinet in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Vijay Nambiar, speaking in his capacity as Special Representative a.i. of the Secretary-General in Myanmar, briefed the Council on recent developments in that country.

Middle East

The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

On 24 March, the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question.

In his briefing, the Secretary-General informed the Council of the Quartet meeting held in Moscow on 19 March and his visit to the Middle East, in particular the statement issued by the Quartet on the following: the need to hold proximity talks; the freezing by Israel of all settlement activity; compliance by the Palestinians with security obligations; lifting the blockade on the Gaza Strip; and its firm support for the Palestinian Authority's programme for the establishment of a Palestinian State.

Members of the Council welcomed the diplomatic efforts made by the Secretary-General and the Quartet to facilitate the relaunching of the Israel-Palestinian peace process. Members of the Council expressed their concern at the continued impasse and tensions between Israel and Palestine and called on Israel to freeze all settlement activity, considering that it was an obstacle to the resumption of peace talks.

Members of the Council reiterated their call on the two parties to adhere to their commitment and to discharge their obligations in accordance with relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the road map, and invited them to make every effort to resume the peace negotiations as soon as possible.

Lebanon

On 12 March the Secretary-General's Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Michael Williams, briefed the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) in consultations of the whole. The Director of the Asia and Middle East Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber, also briefed the Council on the role of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Council members expressed strong support for the important role that UNIFIL continues to play in contributing to peace and stability in southern Lebanon, underlined their concern over all violations of resolution 1701 (2006) and agreed that all parties should fulfil their obligations under that resolution.

II. Thematic issues

Impact of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons on peace and security in Central Africa

On 19 March, the Council held an open debate on the impact of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons on peace and security in Central Africa.

The purpose of the debate was to take into account developments in illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons in the world, and particularly in the Central Africa subregion, and to reflect on innovative measures aimed at more effectively combating and eliminating that phenomenon.

Following the debate, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/6), in which it recalled the humanitarian, economic and social consequences of the illicit, manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation for the security of populations, the persistence of conflicts, outbreaks of gender-based violence and the recruitment of child soldiers. The illicit trafficking in small arms is a serious threat to peace, stability and sustainable development. In the statement the Council also acknowledged the right of States to ensure their defence and security while stressing the vital importance of effective regulations and controls of the transparent trade in small arms and light weapons in order to prevent their illegal diversion and re-export. Lastly, the Council emphasized the importance of the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States to consider the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, to be held in Mexico in June 2010.

Some 40 speakers took part in the debate, including the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, Asha-Rose Migiro, the Secretary-General of the Economic Community of Central African States, Louis Sylvain-Goma, and the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa.

Election of judges

Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice

At its meeting on 18 March, the Council adopted resolution 1914 (2010), in which it decided that the election to fill the vacancy left by Judge Shi Jiuyong would

take place on 29 June 2010 at a meeting of the Security Council and at a meeting of the General Assembly at its sixty-fourth session.

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991

On 18 March, the Council adopted its resolution 1915 (2010), by which it authorized a temporary increase in the total number of ad litem judges to 13 and decided that the number should return to a maximum of 12 by 30 June 2010, or upon completion of the *Popović* case if sooner.

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Security Council

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Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 14
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Identical letters dated 26 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour of writing you to request your kind assistance in circulating the present letter and its annex, the Action Plan of Engagement, as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 14, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alexander **Lomaia**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-46659 (E) 060810

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Annex to the identical letters dated 26 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Action Plan for Engagement

Introduction

Georgia is committed to a renewed, long-term outreach to the populations of its regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, who are under Georgian jurisdiction and are entitled to all benefits available to Georgian citizens. *Georgia seeks to engage with these populations, to reduce their isolation and to improve their welfare, in the interest of human and regional security.*

This policy was set forth in the engagement strategy approved by the Government of Georgia in January 2010. This Action Plan puts that commitment into practical effect, with a range of initiatives that promote the general welfare of the populations currently legitimately residing in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, enable their greater access to benefits and participation in wider civic life and lay the foundation for future reconciliation between divided communities.

All principles of the Action Plan apply in equal measure to the respective populations of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, to their legitimate residents without regard to ethnicity, religion, sex or political beliefs. The Government of Georgia recognizes the differing challenges — from geography, demographics and political considerations — to engagement with the two populations, and the different preferences and opportunities available, and these have been taken into consideration in particular components of the Action Plan.

This is a human-centred approach; the Action Plan is intended to create a favourable environment for intensifying interaction, cooperation and partnerships between the populations across the division lines and to build confidence among all the communities of Georgia. Through the success of these measures, the Government of Georgia seeks to achieve reconciliation and greater trust between divided communities.

The Action Plan follows from the pursuit of *four dimensions* of engagement — humanitarian, human, social and economic — that encompass a comprehensive range of programme areas, with projects falling under one or more programmes. *Seven instruments* will enable the activities the Action Plan promotes and serve the projects created under it. These instruments exemplify the bottom-up approach of the Action Plan, which rests on grassroots initiatives.

All initiatives carried out under the Action Plan will be in accordance with Georgian law; many will require new procedures and administrative structures. The Action Plan includes the legal basis necessary to implement the initiatives of the Government of Georgia. After the Action Plan is adopted, a package of legislative amendments will be drafted and submitted to the Parliament of Georgia.

The Law on Occupied Territories, adopted in October 2008 by the Parliament of Georgia and amended in February 2010 in accordance with the recommendations

of the Venice Commission, reserves to the Government of Georgia the right to consent on activities that respond to humanitarian needs and support confidence building. The Action Plan is the expression of the Government of Georgia's support for projects and programmes that are in line with the goals of the engagement strategy and in compliance with the Law on Occupied Territories. An executive edict will provide for a prior approval of projects carried out under the Action Plan, obviating the need for exemptions from the Law on Occupied Territories.

Methodology

The Action Plan reflects the Government of Georgia's intentions, but it has been developed in concert with all stakeholders in the engagement strategy: political parties, civil-society organizations, groups of experts, international NGOs, foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations. It incorporates previously adopted joint projects and confidence-building measures with Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, and drafts have been shared with the authorities in control in those regions. The Action Plan's success will require the continued interest and support of all stakeholders.

The Action Plan is a comprehensive document and framework for future development. It centers on *four dimensions* of *programme areas and projects* to directly benefit the populations of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and their engagement with counterparts across the division lines, which are enabled by a collection of *seven instruments*.

The Office of the State Minister for Reintegration (SMR) is the lead agency in developing the Action Plan, and will oversee its implementation. The SMR will coordinate the efforts of the Georgian Government in support of the Action Plan. The SMR will welcome the advice of civil society in coordinating the efforts of implementing partners.

The Action Plan is a *foundation* for the programmes that will serve the Strategy. It is a living document; the Action Plan will be subject to an operational review every six months, and to a strategic review after three years, by an interministerial working group under the Deputy Prime Minister/State Minister for Reintegration. This working group will monitor and evaluate implementation of the Action Plan, with input from all stakeholders.

The Government of Georgia actively seeks project contributions from partners in the Action Plan's implementation as well as from Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, and it will establish a consultation mechanism for these contributions.

Four Dimensions of Engagement

The Government of Georgia seeks comprehensively to engage with the populations of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, along humanitarian, human, social and economic dimensions. The heart of the Action Plan is a catalogue of projects that seek directly to improve the welfare of the populations of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia — so that they have the same opportunities available to the rest of Georgia — and support interaction between divided communities. The urgency of addressing these needs is underscored by the United Nations' 2015 target date for meeting the Millennium Development Goals

for poverty, health care, education, gender equality, environmental protection and international cooperation.

The State Strategy identified a number of programme areas and goals; the Action Plan elaborates projects within them that the Government of Georgia has already undertaken, intends to undertake or seeks partner organisations to undertake. The programme areas are:

Humanitarian Dimension

- Humanitarian relief
- Natural disasters
- *Human dimension*
- Intercommunity relations
- Preservation of cultural heritage and identity
- Free flow of information
- Human rights
- Youth activities

Social Dimension

- Education
- Health care
- Environment

Economic Dimension

- Trade
- Joint Production
- Communications
- Infrastructure

Instruments for Engagement

Seven new instruments enable implementation of the Action Plan. Different instruments provide for the integration of residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia into Georgian civic life; facilitate communication and coordination between Tbilisi and the authorities in control in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia; and create the institutional, financial and administrative bases for projects carried out under the Action Plan. Each instrument will serve a distinct, complementary purpose. While these instruments will be free standing, the SMR will coordinate their functioning and will continue to develop and implement Georgia's policy of engagement with Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia.

Status-Neutral Liaison Mechanism

The Action Plan will establish a status-neutral liaison mechanism (LM) to facilitate communication among the Government of Georgia, the authorities in control in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and voluntary associations operating in there. The LM will facilitate or execute mutually approved projects and support implementers in their operations.

The LM will consist of Liaison Officers appointed with consent from both parties, with offices and small support staffs in Sokhumi, Tskhinvali and Tbilisi. It can be based on previous arrangements, such as the Georgian/ Abkhaz Joint Bilateral Coordination Commission. The LM will be operated under the umbrella of an international humanitarian organization.

Neutral Identification Card and Travel Document

Two new documents will allow residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia greater access to social services and freedom of movement. These documents will be introduced without prejudice to Georgian citizens' identification cards or passports.

The entire population of Georgia is entitled to the same civil rights and social benefits, and the Government of Georgia seeks to improve access for all. To address the practical and political difficulties that some legitimate residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia face in obtaining Georgian identification documents, legislation will be introduced that provides for an easily obtained "neutral identification card" (NID), which allows the holder to claim all the social benefits available to Georgian citizens, to conduct business and other activities in Georgia and to seek employment in the private or public sectors. ("Neutral" in this sense means "neutral with respect to citizenship status". The issuance and acceptance of an NID is solely for practical purposes. For residents of Abkhazia, the NID will be written in Georgian and Abkhaz, in accordance with the Constitution of Georgia).

This card enables the holder to acquire a "neutral travel document" (NTD), allowing for travel abroad (the NTD is, essentially, a laissez-passer). The NTD will obviate the need for a foreign passport issued in violation of international law, as confirmed by the report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia ("Tagliavini Report"). The NTD will be developed with the assistance of international legal experts, to benefit from lessons learned elsewhere and to harmonize with international law.

Trust Fund

A trust fund (TF), managed by an international organization according to best practices, with an advisory function for donors, will be established to provide grants to implementing organizations operating in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and across the division lines. The TF will ease the matching of donors and grantees and ensure that funded projects support the goals in the four dimensions of the Action Plan, but will not preclude funding of worthy projects by interested donors, in consultation with the SMR.

The precise format of the trust fund will be determined after adoption of the Action Plan; models might include the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund or the

World Bank Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. The TF will also take into account lessons learned from the EU/UNDP Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism (COBERM).

Joint Investment Fund

A joint investment fund (JIF) will be established to provide seed money to ventures operating in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and across the division lines. The JIF will support businesses that promote local economic development, generate employment and build commercial ties between communities on both sides of the division lines. The privately operated JIF will be jointly funded by donors and businesses, and will engage the services of national and regional Chambers of Commerce.

Cooperation Agency

A cooperation agency (CA) will be established to enable and facilitate interactions across the division lines. Implementing the engagement strategy will require new functions that cannot be delegated from existing executive agencies, so the CA will be established as a legal person of public law (LPPL) under the authority of the SMR. The CA will act in accordance with the policies of the Government of Georgia in assisting state-funded programmes. It will assist organisations that seek help in finding partners across the division lines, coordinate the efforts of local authorities to improve the local operating environments, ensure that project activity and business development complies with Georgian and international law and promote opportunities to potential implementers in Georgia and abroad.

Financial Institution

The normal operations of humanitarian and development organizations and businesses present in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia entail financial transactions there. A financial institution (FI) will be established in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia that will allow for accounts setup and maintenance, cash transfers and other legal transactions. One option is for the FI to be operated by a bank already established in Georgia, without offering all the services of a retail or commercial bank.

Integrated Social-Economic Zone

Integrated Social-Economic Zones (ISEZ), with facilities for business and social services, will be established in the areas adjacent to the division lines in territory under Georgian control, thereby creating demand for goods and service from across the division lines.

An ISEZ creates a value chain across the division line, from the supply of raw materials to production, packaging, quality control and distribution. It will focus on agriculture, but envisages the development of other added-value businesses. The concept also entails a needs assessment and providing seeds and technical assistance (vocational training, machinery for cultivation and maintenance, etc.) to farmers. Processing and packaging facilities for agricultural products will be built within the ISEZ. The benefits to businesses could trump political objections and the added transaction costs of crossing the division lines.

Enterprises operating in an ISEZ and employing the population there may be exempted from some taxes.

An ISEZ will also promote agricultural exports, taking advantage of Georgia's business ties as well as special trade regimes that Georgia enjoys or will enjoy in the future. An accredited laboratory and standards agency will certify for export products produced in the zone as well as those brought there from Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia.

Programme Areas and Projects

This list is illustrative and should not be regarded as definitive; the Government of Georgia invites all interested parties to propose and carry out projects that support the shared goals expressed in the Action Plan. Furthermore, the programme areas are only for clarity of organisation; many projects serve multiple goals and fit within multiple programme areas. (Unless otherwise specified, "joint" refers to populations on both sides of division lines, with a special emphasis on IDPs and divided communities.)

Humanitarian Dimension

Humanitarian Relief

The Action Plan supports the ongoing efforts of those organizations providing relief to the conflict-affected populations of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity. New instruments established under the Action Plan will reduce the administrative burden on these organizations.

Natural Disaster Response

Natural disasters affect populations without regard for division lines. The Action Plan includes measures to reduce the harm from environmental disasters and epidemics in conflict-affected areas.

- Conduct joint analyses of common threats to which the region is prone, including earthquakes, landslides and avalanches and animal-borne infectious diseases.
- Develop joint emergency-preparedness mechanisms (rescue and rehabilitation).
- Conduct joint training for emergency responders.

Human Dimension

Intercommunity Relations

The Action Plan rests not only on cooperation in practical matters of material benefit, but on re-establishing connections that are essential to reconciliation and of value in their own right. Except where noted, these measures concern connections between communities residing in Abkhazia or the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and exiled communities.

The Action Plan builds on the confidence-building efforts and informal dialogue of civil-society groups. The Government of Georgia places particular

importance on United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, and the SMR will ensure that the Action Plan is implemented in its spirit.

The Action Plan will support initiatives that:

- Allow for visits for family events, including births, weddings, funerals and gravesite visitations and religious rites.
- Enable mixed families to gather and visit across the division lines.
- Allow for meetings of elders councils.
- Allow for religious pilgrimages and access to cultural and historical sites.
- Provide for exchanges between journalists.
- Provide for exchanges between professionals (not limited to exiled communities).
- Promote cultural and athletic exchanges (not limited to exiled communities).
- Establish a commission for reburials, prisoner exchanges and missing-in-action matters.

Preservation of Cultural Heritage and Identity

The Action Plan includes further measures to actively promote the preservation and development of Abkhaz and Ossetian cultural heritage and identity in Georgia. This includes measures to protect Ossetian as a national-minority language and Abkhaz as an official language in Abkhazia, as stipulated in the Constitution of Georgia.

- Produce books on Abkhaz culture, in Abkhaz and Georgian, and on Ossetian culture, in Ossetian and Georgian.
- Provide Abkhaz- and Ossetian-language training in Georgian schools and universities.
- Establish contacts with Abkhaz-Diaspora organizations engaged in cultural-heritage preservation and hold an annual conference on Abkhaz culture.
- Seek UNESCO support for joint activities on cultural preservation.
- Support the development of the Sokhumi archive (the Tbilisi archive is already donating materials).
- Establish Abkhaz- and Ossetian-culture centers in a museum in Tbilisi.
- Support Abkhaz- and Ossetian-language radio broadcasts.
- Provide for the free exercise of religion, by easing travel for clergy and the transport of religious articles across the division lines (handled in the LM).

Free Flow of Information

All elements of the Action Plan contribute to, and benefit from, the free flow of information between divided communities. The Action Plan contains measures targeted at improving the flow:

- Provide for regularly scheduled meetings of journalists from Abkhazia, the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia.
- Include residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia in Georgian study tours or other programs to the EU, NATO and other international organisations.
- Provide a joint web portal for communication and social networking between divided communities. Promote use of the internet, taking advantage of the low-cost, high-speed access provided by the Government of Georgia.
- Improving the capacity of radio- and television-transmitting stations near the division lines.

Human Rights

Georgia has an interest in the protection of the human rights of all its residents, including those in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia. The Action Plan includes measures to ensure those protections and promote understanding of human rights.

- Invite international human-rights organisations and intergovernmental organisations concerned with human rights to monitor human rights on the ground in conflict-affected areas, within agreed frameworks.
- Promote education on human-rights issues in conflict-affected areas, by translating and providing instructional booklets and holding seminars.
- Support groups advocating for social justice and property rights in conflict-affected areas.

Youth Activities

Young people of the divided communities do not have preconflict memories of their shared past. The Action Plan includes athletic, cultural and recreational activities to bring together youth from across the division lines, to promote friendship and understanding in the next generations.

- Stage concerts and theatrical productions with youth performers from across the division lines.
- Hold sports tournaments and clinics for young athletes from across the division lines.
- Create summer camps for children from across the division lines.
- Promote joint youth-leadership programmes for the future elites of Georgia.
- Extend the eligibility for youth grant programs to residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia.

Social Dimension

Education

In order to ensure that residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia have access to the education benefits/avenues offered to all Georgian citizens, holders of the NID are eligible for entrance to Georgian universities, for

international scholarship programmes for Georgian students and for international exchange programmes for Georgian teachers. The Action Plan, further, introduces proactive steps to ease and encourage the availability of existing educational avenues to residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia:

- Extend the offer of nationwide university-entrance exams in Abkhaz and Ossetian languages to NID holders, and introduce exams in Russian for them.
- Certify to international standards educational credentials of students from Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia.
- Provide all first-grade pupils in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia with a laptop computer, under the new Government of Georgia nationwide "one laptop per child" programme.
- Extend the new "Teach and Learn with Georgia" programme to Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia. This programme provides a thousand English-language instructors across Georgia; other programmes could support widespread instruction in European languages that allow for greater international integration.
- Create elementary textbooks and kindergarten-level reading materials in Abkhaz and Ossetian, under an extraministerial commission and a task group at the Georgian Ministry of Education, in collaboration with scholars from Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia.
- Expand the scope of Abkhazian studies at Tbilisi State University, and establish academic exchanges with institutions in Abkhazia.
- Offer research grants for joint research projects.
- Offer support (printed materials, electronic resources, facilities and management) to libraries in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia.

Health care

All health-care benefits for Georgian citizens are open to residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia; holders of the neutral ID are able to receive medical treatment in Georgia, including emergency transportation. The Action Plan includes further active measures to improve health and health care in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia:

- Conduct joint needs assessments to determine which resources are best made available in Tbilisi and what needs to be provided in Zugdidi or Gori. Focus on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, cancer, drug abuse and trans-boundary infectious threats.
- Form joint working groups on health care, with an emphasis on early warning.
- Conduct inventories of ongoing medicine needs in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, for insulin and tuberculosis drugs.
- Extend eligibility for health insurance to residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, and establish a special operating fund for those conditions not covered by health insurance.

- Provide mobile clinics to residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia.
- Provide opportunities for cooperation on sanitary and phytosanitary issues.
- Provide HIV/AIDS voluntary counselling and testing services.
- Provide access to infertility treatment.

Environment

The natural environment is a treasure of all of Georgia's regions, and environmental degradation does not respect political division lines.

- Promote protection of the environment in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, through support to environmental NGOs, advocacy groups and watchdog organisations.
- Establish protected areas in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, on the model of Georgia's national-parks system. Seek UNESCO protected-area status.

Economic Dimension

Trade and division-line crossings have persisted, despite the hardships imposed by conflict, as a result of established relations and the proximity of production and trading centers on both sides. In particular, Zugdidi and Gori are attractive markets for businesspeople and consumers in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, respectively, as they are closer than other potential markets of equivalent size and because many goods are less expensive there than elsewhere.

The Action Plan supports existing trade relations by eliminating obstacles, and promotes new trade opportunities. Measures to improve economic relations, infrastructure and transportation links include:

Trade

- Ease access to market by offering buses from the division lines to Zugdidi, Kutaisi, Batumi, Gori or Tbilisi, or allowing buses with license plates issued in Abkhazia or the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia to cross the division lines and improving roads to trading centers.
- Promote employment and the development of labour-intensive industries, through vocational education and the establishment of learning centres in the ISEZs.
- Enable integration into international commerce, by establishing an accredited quality-control laboratory and standards agency to certify production to international and regional standards.

Joint Production

- Promote joint production ventures.
- Provide start-up funding to joint-production ventures operating across division lines.

Communications

- Re-establish postal service with Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region South Ossetia.
- Provide low-cost, high-speed internet service to Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region South Ossetia.
- Restore the Gori-Tskhinvali transmission line to provide communications services to the population of the Tskhinvali region South Ossetia.
- Conduct joint studies on the Poti-Sokhumi undersea trunk line, to provide a broad range of telecommunications service and information access to the population of Abkhazia.

Infrastructure

- Establish a passenger-ferry service between Batumi and Sokhumi.
- Rehabilitate irrigation systems.
- Rehabilitate schools and hospitals in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvaliregion South Ossetia, providing sanitation and protection against the elements. A project would conduct a needs assessment and prioritize facilities for rehabilitation.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), by which the Council decided to establish the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and requested that I report at regular intervals on the implementation of its mandate. The present report covers the activities of UNMIK, and developments related thereto, from 16 March to 15 July 2010.

II. Political situation and Mission priorities

2. The goal of the Mission remains the promotion of security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo through engagement with all communities in Kosovo, with the leadership in Pristina and Belgrade, and with regional and international actors. The United Nations funds and programmes, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) have continued to play important roles within the framework of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

3. In line with the Security Council presidential statement of 26 November 2008 (S/PRST/2008/44) and my report of 24 November 2008 (S/2008/692), EULEX has continued to operate under the overall authority and within the status-neutral framework of the United Nations. UNMIK, EULEX and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) regularly exchange information and coordinate effectively at the operational and strategic levels. As per established practice, the quarterly report on EULEX activities, submitted by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is contained in annex I to the present report.

4. The strongest comparative advantage of the United Nations in Kosovo continues to be its acceptance among all the communities in Kosovo. Capitalizing on this asset, UNMIK and the United Nations team in Kosovo have been developing a joint United Nations strategic framework for Kosovo that identifies common priorities to be addressed in order to maximize the impact of the overall United Nations efforts in Kosovo.

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5. Since my last report to the Security Council (S/2010/169), dated 6 April 2010, four additional States have recognized Kosovo, bringing the total to 69.

6. On 31 March, Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi announced changes in the composition of the Cabinet, with the replacement of six ministers — three from each of the two governing coalition parties, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). In April, a PDK minister was appointed to the newly created Kosovo Ministry of European Integration. There was a further reshuffle in June, when five deputy ministers were replaced and five were appointed to newly created positions. The reshuffle, which the Prime Minister announced was intended to increase efficiency, left the balance between the coalition parties essentially unaltered.

7. The Kosovo Serb-majority municipalities established following the November 2009 elections have set up their administrative structures; it is still early to assess their performance with respect to addressing their constituents' needs. On 30 March, the decentralized municipalities of Graçanicë/Gračanica, Kllokot-Vërboc/Klokot-Vrbovac, Ranillug/Ranilug, and the expanded Novobërdë/Novo Brdo municipality signed a memorandum of understanding with their parent municipalities on the handover of cadastral and civil registry records; the handover of records has begun in Graçanicë/Gračanica and Ranillug/Ranilug. All the decentralized municipalities except for Graçanicë/Gračanica, where no deputy has yet been appointed, have appointed Kosovo Albanian deputy mayors; in Novobërdë/Novo Brdo, where a Kosovo Albanian was elected as mayor, a Kosovo Serb was appointed as his deputy.

8. As part of the ongoing decentralization process, on 20 June, 2,292 voters, or 65.3 per cent of the registered voters, turned out for the mayoral and Municipal Assembly elections in the new, predominantly Kosovo Serb-inhabited municipality of Partesh/Parteš. No incidents were reported during those elections. Belgrade-organized elections were held in Novobërdë/Novo Brdo and northern Mitrovica on 30 May; the results indicate a 75 per cent and a 30.5 per cent turnout, respectively.

9. The Kosovo authorities voiced their strong opposition to the elections in northern Mitrovica, characterizing them as a "violation of the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Kosovo by the Government of Serbia". Similarly, the Serbian Government characterized the elections in Partesh/Parteš as a violation of resolution 1244 (1999). UNMIK continues to adhere to its policy of non-interference with elections that are not called by my Special Representative.

10. On 2 June, my Special Representative and Kosovo representatives attended the European Union-sponsored High-Level Meeting on the Western Balkans in Sarajevo. A Serbian delegation also attended. The European Union presidency issued a final statement reiterating its commitment to the European perspective of the western Balkan countries.

11. On 24 June, I sent a letter to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, suggesting that we explore how best to address the remaining challenges related to Kosovo, following the issuance of the advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice on the question "Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?". In my letter, I proposed that the United Nations and the European Union, which has a vital role in promoting a dialogue aimed at addressing issues of common concern between

Belgrade and Pristina, agree on a coordinated approach. In her response, dated 8 July, the High Representative indicated that the European Union would like to offer its assistance to both Belgrade and Pristina to help them continue in their paths towards Europe and that it will coordinate efforts with my Special Representative and with my Representative in Belgrade following the delivery of the advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice.

III. Engagement with Pristina and Belgrade and practical arrangements

12. Relations between UNMIK and the Kosovo authorities continue to be courteous, if at arm's length. UNMIK staff maintain frequent contacts with their Kosovo counterparts at the working level and my Special Representative occasionally has meetings at the senior level. With regard to Serbia, my Special Representative has met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and my Representative in Belgrade maintained regular contacts with the Serbian authorities.

13. With UNMIK facilitation, Belgrade and Pristina continue to cooperate on missing persons' issues through the Working Group on Missing Persons, chaired by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and on religious and cultural heritage issues through the Reconstruction Implementation Commission for the Serbian Orthodox religious heritage sites in Kosovo. The European Union facilitator for the protection of the religious and cultural heritage of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo has begun his important work, and I would urge all stakeholders to extend to him their full cooperation, as has UNMIK.

14. The problem of missing persons remains a major challenge to the process of reconciliation between the communities. ICRC has estimated that, as at 27 April 2010, 1,862 individuals were still missing across Kosovo. During the reporting period, two sessions of the Working Group on Missing Persons were held in Pristina. At the first of these, on 8 April, representatives of Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb families expressed dissatisfaction with the progress made to date and demanded that the issue be de-politicized. In this regard, the cooperation between Serbia's war crimes prosecutor's office, EULEX and the Pristina-Belgrade Working Group on Missing Persons in the identification of possible mass gravesites in southern Serbia should be welcomed. On 29 April, the Kosovo representatives on the Working Group on Missing Persons participated in the inspection of a potential gravesite in the municipality of Medvedja in Serbia. UNMIK facilitated the participation and accompanied the Kosovo representatives to the site visit.

15. Regrettably, practical cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina has yet to materialize in other areas. Continuing efforts by EULEX to re-establish a fully functioning multi-ethnic court located in the northern part of Mitrovica and fully fledged customs controls at gates 1 and 31 have not resulted in significant progress during the reporting period.

IV. Northern Kosovo

16. The situation in northern Kosovo remained politically delicate; the end of the reporting period, in particular, was marked by two episodes that increased tensions.

On 2 July, the Kosovo authorities inaugurated a civil service centre in Bosniak Mahala, an ethnically mixed area in northern Mitrovica. UNMIK was not consulted on the opening of the centre, which was considered by the Kosovo Serb community to be part of the efforts of the Kosovo authorities to establish their institutions in the north. Some 1,500 Kosovo Serbs converged to protest the official opening of the centre. Twelve people were injured by an unidentified explosive device, including 11 Kosovo Serb protesters and a Kosovo Bosniak pediatrician who died as a result of his injuries. After a plaque bearing the inscription "Republic of Kosovo" was removed from the facade of the centre, the situation calmed down and the crowd dispersed. Since then, the civil service centre has remained open.

17. While both Pristina and Belgrade strongly condemned the incident and called for the arrest of the perpetrators, each side claimed that the other is responsible for provoking the incident. My Special Representative expressed deep concern over the violence that occurred and offered condolences to the family of the victim. He also called on all sides to refrain from provocative statements, to remain calm and to commit to dialogue as a necessary process to address the challenges faced in northern Kosovo. At Serbia's request, the Council met on 6 July to discuss this incident.

18. On 5 July, a member of the Assembly of Kosovo belonging to the Serb community, Petar Miletić, was shot at by unknown perpetrators in front of his house in northern Mitrovica. He sustained flesh wounds in both legs. The criminal cases are being investigated jointly by the Kosovo Police and EULEX.

19. Careful handling of the reconstruction and returns activities in the inter-ethnic Kroi i Vitakut/Brdjani neighbourhood has so far resulted in a peaceful building season. As of 15 July, Kosovo Albanians have completed 20 houses in Kroi i Vitakut/Brdjani, and are reconstructing 14 more, 4 of which are located in the adjoining area that falls within the boundaries of Zvečan municipality. Twenty Kosovo Albanian families with 143 family members returned to their homes. The construction by Kosovo Serbs of five new buildings is reaching completion. UNMIK has continued to facilitate meetings with both communities in order to solve problems faced by residents with regard to electricity and water supply, the construction of sewage systems and roads.

20. Since October 2009, the Electric Power Industry of Serbia has remained the only electricity provider for the northern municipalities and has begun to effect disconnections of non-paying customers. At present, it is not charging the Kosovo Albanian community in the north for the electricity consumed.

V. Security

21. The overall security situation in Kosovo remained relatively calm, but incidents persisted. Compared to the last reporting period, the number of security incidents decreased. The most notable were incidents related to the spontaneous return of 23 Kosovo Serbs to the village Zallq/Žac, in Istog/Istok municipality. Responses by the Pristina authorities and local-level institutions and the Kosovo police following these incidents improved over time and outreach visits to those affected became more frequent, but the receiving community remains worryingly hostile [see sect. VII on returns].

22. On 24 March, about 50 Kosovo Serbs protested against EULEX customs operations at gate 1. On 26 March, a Kosovo Serb off-duty police officer and his wife were assaulted by four Kosovo Albanian males. In the course of April and May, five explosions occurred in northern Kosovo that caused material damage to a police station, homes, vehicles and Kosovo mobile telephone network repeater installations. On 14 May and 10 June, stones were thrown at a bus providing a humanitarian transportation service for Kosovo Albanians from villages north of the Ibër/Ibar river.

23. The day of the 30 May elections in northern Mitrovica was marked by confrontations between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. Under the leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army war veterans' organization, some 2,000 Kosovo Albanians gathered in southern Mitrovica to protest the elections. Almost simultaneously, some 1,000 Kosovo Serbs gathered on the north side of the main bridge. Prompt reaction by security forces, including the Kosovo Police, EULEX and KFOR, prevented clashes between the two groups. However, stones were thrown by both sides and two Kosovo Police officers sustained minor injuries, before the protesters dispersed peacefully.

24. On 9 June, in an ethnically mixed neighbourhood of northern Mitrovica, a group of Kosovo Albanian teenagers was attacked by several Kosovo Serb youths. UNMIK facilitated a meeting between Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian community leaders to discuss the situation. Although all participants condemned the incident and appealed to residents to refrain from such actions, on 10 June three Kosovo Serbs were physically assaulted by a group of Kosovo Albanians near the northern bank of the Ibër/Ibar. Since then there have been increased patrols by the Kosovo Police, EULEX and KFOR, and no further noteworthy incidents have been reported.

25. Security incidents affecting Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanian ethnic communities have also taken place in other areas of Kosovo. In Novobërdë/Novo Brdo, a Kosovo Serb was assaulted on 15 March, allegedly by a group of Kosovo Albanian men. In western Kosovo, two Kosovo Albanians threw stones at a humanitarian bus transportation service for Kosovo Serbs. A group of Kosovo Albanian men were arrested for assaulting a Kosovo Bosniak man in Gjakovë/Djakovica on 15 May. In Prishtinë/Priština region, an Ashkali woman was wounded on 7 March, when a bullet was fired into her house. According to a community representative, a few weeks before the incident the woman's family had received a threatening letter asking them to abandon their property.

26. On 28 June, some 1,500 Serbs gathered in Gazimestan, southeast of Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, to celebrate Saint Vitus' Day, or Vidovdan. Metropolitan Amfilohije, the temporary administrator of the Serbian Orthodox Raška-Prizren Diocese, addressed the audience calling for peace and justice in Kosovo and appealing to the Kosovo authorities to make decisions that are acceptable to all. Participants in the commemoration ceremony burned a United States flag, chanted anti-United States and anti-European Union slogans and sang anti-Albanian songs containing hate speech. Security for the event was provided by some 500 Kosovo Police officers. Following the celebrations, unknown persons pelted with stones four Serbian motorcyclists and a convoy of Serbs escorted by the Kosovo Police returning to northern Mitrovica.

VI. Rule of Law

27. UNMIK continues to exercise certain responsibilities in the area of rule of law, and cooperation at the technical level with the Kosovo Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs, as well as with the Serbia Ministry of Justice, continues to be good.

28. While UNMIK is willing to facilitate communication between the Serbian authorities and non-recognizing States, and the Kosovo Ministry of Justice, the latter began dealing directly with mutual legal assistance requests and responses. Serbia, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Romania, did not accept this practice. During the reporting period, the Serbia Ministry of Justice returned approximately 1,500 requests and responses to EULEX, while the Kosovo Ministry of Justice ceased acting on requests from the Serbia Ministry of Justice; EULEX is attempting to find a solution for mutual legal assistance between them. UNMIK continues to facilitate Kosovo's interaction with Interpol.

29. UNMIK continues to provide document certification services both to Kosovo residents and at the request of non-recognizing States. These services include primarily the certification of civil status, pension and academic documents.

30. The Mitrovica District Court still functions only partially, with EULEX judges and prosecutors operating out of the northern Mitrovica courthouse and dealing solely with criminal cases.

31. On 27 April and on several subsequent occasions, EULEX police conducted extensive searches in the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications and in private residences of persons connected to the Ministry. EULEX issued a communiqué stating that the investigation was in connection with several tenders related to the construction of roads in Kosovo in the period 2007-2009.

VII. Returns

32. According to statistics of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), some 523 displaced persons voluntarily returned to Kosovo during the reporting period, 268 of whom are Kosovo Serbs. At the same time, 756 individuals were forcibly returned to Kosovo, mainly from Western Europe, 594 of whom are majority community members and 162 of whom are persons belonging to minority communities.

33. A total of 15 "go-and-see" visits targeting 176 displaced persons were carried out, which included 10 "go-and-see" visits from Montenegro, four from Serbia, and one from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. UNHCR data also indicates that six "go-and-inform" visits for the benefit of 135 displaced persons also took place within the reporting period.

34. The returns process during this period was not without problems. Disturbances in Zallq/Žac, in Istog/Istok municipality, began after Kosovo Albanians in the receiving community refused to accept Kosovo Serb returnees and accused them of having committed war crimes during the conflict. That was followed by physical attacks and protests against the returnees. However, the majority of the returnees remained steadfast in their determination to stay on, even though four families eventually decided to leave.

35. The Kosovo authorities, including the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Communities and Returns, responded by condemning the incidents. Initially slow in their response, the municipal authorities eventually assured the returnees of their support to reintegrate them into the municipality. 100,000 euros were allocated for the accommodation of the returnees, and the Kosovo Police and KFOR provided protection. Regrettably, this did not stop further attacks by stone-throwing youths and, most recently, the firing of automatic weapons against the tent of a returnee family, which fortunately did not result in any injuries. The situation calmed down somewhat when the Kosovo Police apprehended the alleged perpetrators of the incidents; however, their swift release led to consternation among the Zallq/Žac returnees and potential returnees. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Communities and Returns began the tendering process for the reconstruction of 23 houses in Zallq/Žac and 11 houses in Dragolevc/Dragolevac for the returnees.

36. In a related development, 17 houses were constructed for Kosovo Serb returnee families in Dollc/Dolac village, Klinë/Klina municipality, under the Return and Reintegration in Kosovo project, funded by the Ministry of Communities and Returns and international donors.

VIII. Cultural and religious heritage

37. UNMIK continued to facilitate the work of the Reconstruction Implementation Commission on the reconstruction of 34 Serbian patrimonial, cultural and religious heritage sites that were damaged or destroyed during the March 2004 violence. During the reporting period, the Reconstruction Implementation Commission held two meetings to review the status of the works at a number of Serbian Orthodox Churches. The works at the Church of Saint Nicholas in Prishtinë/Priština and the Parish house of the Church of Holy Virgin Ljeviška in Prizren were completed. The works at three other sites, the Church of Saint Elias in Vushtrri/Vučitrn, the Church of the Assumption of the Holy Virgin in Gjakovë/Đakovica, and the Church of Saint George in Prizren, are progressing well and are expected to be finalized by the end of the summer. While the Reconstruction Implementation Commission is expected to complete its work by the end of 2010, it cannot complete reconstruction of all the sites that were damaged in 2004 owing to insufficient funds.

38. UNMIK also continued to facilitate the activities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Kosovo. During the reporting period, UNESCO and UNMIK signed a follow-up supplementary memorandum for a $163,000 donation from the Government of Albania for the reconstruction of the Catholic Church in Prizren. In June, restoration work began on the Holy Savior Church in Prizren, funded by the €150,000 contribution of the Government of Germany.

39. UNMIK continued to monitor the security arrangements provided for the Serbian Orthodox sites in coordination with EULEX, the Kosovo Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, and KFOR. KFOR continued guarding eight Serbian Orthodox Church sites. Responsibility for static security for the first non-religious site, the Gazimestan monument, built in 1953 to commemorate the battle against the Ottomans in 1389, was transferred from KFOR to the Kosovo Police on 18 March, following a decision by the North Atlantic Council. The Serbian Government voiced opposition to the transfer.

40. During the reporting period, several Serbian cultural and religious sites were vandalized, including the Church of Saint Elias in Vushtrri/Vučitrn and four Orthodox cemetery gravestones in Lipjan/Lipljan in March, as well as a previously damaged Orthodox gravestone in Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje in June.

IX. Community issues

41. On 22 April, the foundations for the construction of 50 houses destined for the most endangered Roma families currently living in Česmin Lug and Osterode camps in northern Mitrovica were laid in the Roma Mahalla, on the southern bank of the Ibër/Ibar River. The construction, conducted as part of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Economic, Social, Transition, Advocacy and Resettlement/Reintegration Programme of the United States Agency for International Development, was allocated $2.4 million for its completion.

42. On 14 May, the Assembly of Kosovo adopted a law on the civil service, which requires Kosovo institutions to set aside at least 10 per cent of civil service posts for employees from non-Albanian communities and municipalities to enable proportionate inclusion of non-majority communities in municipal administrations. On 27 April, a process to amend the Law on the Promotion and Protection of Rights of Communities and their Members was launched, aiming at the inclusion of Montenegrins among the communities protected in Kosovo.

43. On 22 April, the Kosovo Telecommunications Regulatory Authority disconnected, dismantled, seized or destroyed equipment at 26 telecommunications base stations belonging to service providers unlicensed by the Kosovo authorities. The action led to widespread disruption in the communication infrastructure in minority areas, including for emergency services, and obstructed the functioning of several Serbian media outlets licensed by the Independent Media Commission. In what appeared to be retributive action, three transmitters operated by service providers licensed by the Kosovo authorities, located in northern Kosovo, were attacked, including with explosives.

44. Although the Kosovo authorities took steps to lessen the impact of the disconnections on minority communities, and the network was partially restored with the use of technical means from Serbia, minority communities have continued to call for the full reconnection of the networks until a compromise is found to avoid further disruption of vital services, particularly in medical emergency cases. The June 18 deadline announced by the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority for the removal of unlicensed transmitters has been extended indefinitely, while efforts to resolve the issue continue.

X. Human rights

45. The agreements between UNMIK and the Council of Europe on technical arrangements relating to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, continue to serve as the framework for the activities of the relevant monitoring mechanisms for these instruments. UNMIK is engaged in an ongoing dialogue with the Advisory Committee on the Framework

Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on issues relating to the protection of minority communities in Kosovo. From 6 to 15 June, in cooperation with EULEX, UNMIK facilitated the second monitoring visit to Kosovo of the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

46. On 27 May, the Assembly of Kosovo adopted the Kosovo Programme on Gender Equality for 2008-2013, which aims to promote women's integration into the economy, labour market, and decision-making processes, as well as women's education and representation in culture and media.

XI. External representation and regional cooperation

47. Regional cooperation, which is key to much-needed economic development, has continued to suffer setbacks owing to status-related considerations. However, while there are no standardized procedures for the participation of the Kosovo authorities in regional or international forums, UNMIK facilitation has, in most cases, allowed to reconcile the seemingly incompatible demands of the two sides, thus providing a concrete contribution to the development of regional cooperation initiatives.

48. Although the Kosovo authorities appear to believe that the UNMIK facilitation role is not in the interest of their declared sovereign status, UNMIK has had considerable success in facilitating Kosovo's participation in regional and international encounters. As long as resolution 1244 (1999) is in force, UNMIK will continue its facilitation role, where necessary and possible, in order to foster regional dialogue and cooperation.

49. During the reporting period UNMIK facilitated Kosovo's participation in three Central European Free Trade Agreement meetings; six Energy Community meetings; one negotiation meeting on the establishment of a Transport Community; one meeting of the South-East Europe Transport Observatory, seven meetings of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe; four meetings of the Regional Cooperation Council; one meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Investment Compact for South-East Europe (SEE) Investment Committee; one Committee meeting of the Regional School for Public Administration (RESPA) Committee and one meeting of the European Aviation Safety Agency.

XII. Observations

50. The situation in Kosovo has remained relatively stable, although the potential for volatility and instability, especially in northern Kosovo, cannot be underestimated. As highlighted in my last report to the Security Council (S/2010/169), sensitive issues related to northern Kosovo can only be addressed peacefully and through continuing consultation and coordination between all relevant actors, taking into account the specific circumstances and concerns of all communities. I remain concerned over the recent violent events in northern Mitrovica, which clearly demonstrate that any other approach risks increasing instability and furthering the divide between communities, instead of bridging it. I

therefore urge the sides to exercise restraint and adopt a measured, constructive approach in order to avoid further escalations in northern Kosovo, especially following the issuance of the advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice on Kosovo's declaration of independence. I also count on the support of the Security Council in encouraging the sides to commit to dialogue and transparency before any strategies or policies are announced or implemented in the area.

51. The absence of significant progress in reconciliation between the communities, coupled with economic difficulties, continues to present a challenge and to foster the risk of unrest. I am deeply concerned about the continuing harassment of Kosovo Serb returnees in the village of Zallq/Žac, and that the overall numbers of returns remains disappointingly low. I am also concerned about the hate speech that marred the Vidovdan celebrations. These events bear witness to the continuing lack of reconciliation, and indicate that much more must be done to overcome the legacy of the past. In this regard, I would also like to call on all parties to devote additional resources to the important work of locating missing persons from the conflict in order to advance the process of reconciliation.

52. The reconstruction of the Serbian Orthodox sites damaged or destroyed during the violence in March 2004 also represents a significant step towards overcoming the past and rebuilding trust between communities. In this regard, it is regrettable that the Reconstruction Implementation Commission lacks the necessary funding to complete the reconstruction of all the destroyed Serbian Orthodox sites. I appeal to potential donors and to the Kosovo authorities to raise funds in order to enable the continuation of the work of the Reconstruction Implementation Commission and support the completion of the reconstruction process. In addition, I urge all stakeholders to extend their full cooperation to the European Union facilitator for the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church's religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo, who has begun his important work.

53. It is my assessment that this period has not seen sufficient progress in addressing outstanding challenges related to Kosovo, in advancing regional cooperation, or in finding solutions to issues of common concern to communities, as well as to Pristina and Belgrade. It is also my assessment that the period following the issuance of the advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice on Kosovo's declaration of independence will provide for further opportunities in this regard. These opportunities can be best explored through a coherent and inclusive approach by the international actors engaged in Kosovo.

54. I have therefore written on 24 June, to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stressing that, following the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the United Nations stands ready to cooperate and coordinate closely with the European Union, which has a vital role in promoting a dialogue aimed at addressing issues of common concern between Belgrade and Pristina. I am pleased that the High Representative has agreed with my proposal and has expressed appreciation for the contribution of the United Nations in areas where we have unique knowledge and experience. In moving ahead, I look forward to fruitful cooperation with the European Union at all levels, given the positive results of our joint efforts in the region so far.

55. While the present report covers the period up to 15 July, the International Court of Justice delivered on 22 July its advisory opinion on the question "Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-

Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?" The Court concluded that "the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law". Following its delivery, I forwarded the advisory opinion to the General Assembly, which had requested the Court's advice and which will determine how to proceed on this matter. Furthermore, I have strongly encouraged the parties to engage in constructive dialogue and urged all sides to avoid any steps that could be seen as provocative and derail the dialogue.

56. I would like to conclude by expressing my gratitude to my Special Representative for continuing his excellent leadership of the Mission and his efforts to advance cooperation between all sides and help maintain security and stability in Kosovo and in the region. I would also like to commend the staff of UNMIK for their continued dedicated work and commitment to Kosovo and the goals of the United Nations.

57. Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to the long-standing partners of the United Nations in Kosovo — the European Union, NATO and OSCE — as well as to the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes for their ongoing support and cooperation with UNMIK.

Annex I

Report of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Secretary-General on the activities of the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

1. Executive summary

On 8 June 2010, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision extending the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) for a period of two years until 14 June 2012. This decision underlines the strong commitment of the European Union to Kosovo, to the rule of law in particular and to Kosovo's European perspective.

EULEX continued to work closely with the leading authorities in Kosovo, including the Prime Minister, and the relevant line ministries. Meetings of the Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board, co-chaired by the head of EULEX and the Deputy Prime Minister, continued to take place on a monthly basis, as a mechanism for discussion of a range of rule of law issues. Working groups coordinate the follow-up to the consultations of the Board. From 9 to 11 June, the recently established EULEX Human Rights Review Panel held its first regular session.

EULEX continued to undertake monitoring, mentoring and advising activities in the area of rule of law, and to implement its executive functions according to its mandate. The Mission worked with the Kosovo rule of law authorities on planning and implementation of targeted monitoring, mentoring and advising, focusing especially on management level capacity and methodology in the Kosovo police, justice and customs. The activities and results of monitoring, mentoring and advising actions from mid-2009 to 2010 were made public in June in the Programme Report 2010.

EULEX continued to work closely with UNMIK and with other European Union entities in Kosovo, in particular the European Union Special Representative for Kosovo and the European Commission Liaison Office in Kosovo, and to coordinate closely with KFOR.

EULEX continued its dialogue with the Serbian rule of law authorities. Senior staff of the three mission components maintained contacts and cooperation with Belgrade. EULEX cooperated with the Serbian authorities in a number of ongoing and potential war crimes cases.

Significant progress was made with trials and processing of cases, including those handed over by UNMIK. By July EULEX judges had completed the cases received from UNMIK at the Supreme Court and district court level. EULEX continued to hold hearings and trials in Mitrovicë/a District Court, while EULEX prosecutors and investigators focused their work on a number of organized crime and war crime cases. It has not yet been possible, however, to resume mixed panels in the District Court. The joint EULEX and Kosovo Office on Missing Persons and Forensics handed over the remains of 43 individuals to families and participated in working group sessions in Belgrade and Pristina. EULEX continued to support Kosovo Police preparations for the gradual assumption of responsibility for the

protection of cultural/historical sites, which started with the handing over of guarding the Gazimestan monument in March. As before, EULEX formed police units stood ready to act as second responder in case of disturbances. The situation, however, was on the whole stable, with the exception of one security incident in the north of Kosovo in July.

EULEX Customs continued scanning data on commercial traffic at gates 1 and 31 in northern Kosovo. The data is shared with the Kosovo Customs and the Serbian Customs Administration.

EULEX Head of Mission attended the Security Council meeting on 6 July and provided an assessment following the incidents in northern Mitrovicë/a on 2 and 5 July 2010.

2. Activities of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo for the period from March to July 2010

General

On 6 July 2010 the EULEX Mission had 2,746 staff (1,633 international staff and 1,100 local staff). The Mission continued to implement its monitoring, mentoring and advising activities in the area of rule of law throughout Kosovo. It also implemented its executive mandate. EULEX continued its close cooperation with UNMIK, particularly on the exchange of information and issues in the north of Kosovo, and closely coordinated its activities with the other European Union actors in Kosovo and with other international stakeholders in Kosovo and in the region. EULEX continued cooperation with the rule of law authorities in Montenegro, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

EULEX police, justice and customs components continued the implementation of targeted monitoring, mentoring and advising activities with the Kosovo rule of law authorities, focusing especially on management level capacity and methodology in the Kosovo police, justice and customs. Progress is not even, as it varies according to the capacity of the Kosovo Police, Kosovo Customs and the judiciary to drive the reforms needed. Overall progress and achievements are described in a programme report, published in early June 2010.

In the north of Kosovo, EULEX and other European Union actors continued to step up their visibility and outreach activities. On 26 March, a press point took place at EU House with EULEX Head of Mission, the European Union facilitator for the north of Kosovo, and the European Commission Liaison Office in Kosovo; a further outreach event was held on 23 June. They re-emphasized the commitment of the European Union to Kosovo, underlining that the increased presence in Mitrovicë/a north is aimed at promoting European values there, and to help improve inter-ethnic relations. A number of trials were held in Mitrovicë/a District Court; however, it has not yet been possible to resume mixed panels, owing to the continued lack of Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb judges and prosecutors.

On 2 July, approximately 1,000 people gathered for a peaceful protest in response to the opening of an Office of the Kosovo ministries of local government and internal affairs in the ethnically mixed neighbourhood of Bosnjačka Mahalla/ Lagjia e Boshnjakëve in northern Mitrovicë/a. The demonstration was organized by representatives of the Kosovo Serb community. EULEX deployed formed police units in order to guarantee the right to peaceful demonstration, protect private

property and preserve public order. During the course of the demonstration, a hand grenade was thrown at a group of people in a parallel street, about 600 metres from the Office. The grenade injured 11 persons, and 1 of them (a Kosovo Bosniak) died later from his injuries. The Kosovo Police Major Crime Unit from Pristina has taken over the investigation, with close monitoring, mentoring and advising by EULEX. On 5 July, a Kosovo Serb member of the Kosovo Assembly was shot in the leg by a masked perpetrator. His injuries were not fatal. Both investigations are being actively monitored by EULEX.

EULEX continued to advise the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in particular on civil status, civil registration, and migration and asylum issues. EULEX has monitored closely the establishment of the new Civil Registration Agency. Integrating databases and modernizing the outdated civil status system remain challenges in Kosovo.

In early June EULEX and the Kosovo Ministry of Economy and Finance signed a technical arrangement on the eventual transitioning of the EULEX Financial Intelligence Centre to the future Financial Intelligence Unit.

The dialogue with Belgrade on police, justice and customs matters continued. EULEX prosecutors and investigators continued to meet Serbian counterparts in Belgrade on a monthly basis to discuss war crime cases and exchange information. Technical discussions between the EULEX Customs component and the Belgrade Customs authorities also continued. On 2 June the first regular meeting between the EULEX Border and Boundary Police with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia took place in Kuršumlija.

The EULEX human rights accountability mechanism — the Human Rights Review Panel — is now able to process allegations of human rights violations by EULEX in the conduct of its executive mandate. The Human Rights Review Panel held its first meeting on 4 May and its first formal session on 11 June.

War crimes

EULEX Police continued to work on the remaining 850 war crime cases taken over from UNMIK Police, as well as the 60 active prosecutorial cases, in cooperation with the Special Prosecution Office of Kosovo. By September 2010, they will have been prioritized for future investigative action. EULEX has made progress in several additional war crimes cases and has handed over two cases to the Kosovo Police for investigation. On 6 May in Pristina the EULEX War Crimes Investigation Unit and the Kosovo Police arrested a war crimes suspect in connection with war crimes allegedly committed between April and June 1999 and on 12 May searched the house of another suspect in Prizren.

EULEX coordinated the transfer of 11 witnesses to the Serbian War Crimes Prosecution Office in Belgrade to testify in the Qyshkë/Ćuška massacre case, in which nine suspects were arrested in Serbia. The location of a potential mass grave site in Rudnice Quarry, Raška, just north of gate 1, was confirmed, with EULEX assistance. The Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor applied for an order for exhumation at the site, and, on 25 June, a team of EULEX/Office on Missing Persons and Forensics forensic experts were given permission to undertake an initial site evaluation of the alleged mass grave site at Raška. The EULEX/Office on Missing Persons and Forensics specialists were accompanied by a Serbian judge and the Serbian Police.

Police

EULEX continued to provide monitoring, mentoring and advice to the Kosovo Police. On 28 May the new structure of the Kosovo Police was approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs. The creation of a new Kosovo Police structure is a positive development. EULEX, in cooperation with the Kosovo Police, completed a Kosovo-wide assessment of 18 cultural heritage sites under Kosovo Police responsibility.

On 18 March KFOR officially handed over responsibility for security of the Gazimestan monument near Pristina to Kosovo Police. EULEX monitored the Kosovo Police team at the site twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, for an initial period of one week and stood ready to react as second responder.

EULEX closely monitored cross-border cooperation between Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia following several cases of seizures of weapons and shootings in the proximity of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia border.

The Kosovo Police reviewed their operational plans for civil emergencies, developed training at the police station level and continued to coordinate planning with other local agencies. The municipalities have not yet completed their local security assessments. All these efforts in the civil emergency field have been enhanced at the request of EULEX. There is still scope for improvement in coordination between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Kosovo Police in the civil emergency field, and a shortage of funds earmarked for emergency services, including in the Kosovo Police. The Kosovo Police is making progress in intelligence-led policing.

EULEX formed police units stood by on several occasions in case they needed to act as second responders, including during protests on 30 May and 2 July in north Mitrovicë/a and the Saint Vitus' Day, or Vidovdan, celebrations on 28 June. There was no need for intervention in any of the cases.

Using their executive mandate, the EULEX Police continued investigations into a number of cases. On 28 April 2010, the EULEX Police Executive Department carried out searches in the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications and in private residences of persons connected with the Ministry, as part of an investigation led by the Special Prosecution Office of Kosovo. The investigations continue.

On 27 May the Kosovo Police Organized Crime Unit, under the lead of a EULEX prosecutor from the Special Prosecution Office of Kosovo, arrested two men in the Prizren region in connection with a major investigation into drug trafficking. Simultaneously, the Albanian police arrested a man in the Kukes area of Albania. The Kosovo Police carried out a number of searches and seized material, including several weapons and large amounts of cash. These police actions were part of a larger Europe-wide investigation and connected to previous drug seizures across Europe.

Justice

EULEX continued monitoring, mentoring and advising the Kosovo judiciary, including advising the Ministry of Justice on the drafting of laws, such as those on the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council, the Kosovo Judicial Council, the State

Prosecutor, and the new draft Criminal Procedure and Criminal Procedural Codes. EULEX considers that the Kosovo justice system is still weak.

Interference at different levels and in a variety of forms was observed. This interference, both in criminal and civil proceedings, has often resulted in practical problems, such as the refusal of local judges, prosecutors, and defence lawyers to deal with sensitive cases. The capacity of the criminal justice system to move forward with reform remained fragile and inconsistent. However, the Judicial Disciplinary Committee, composed of one local and two EULEX members, continued conducting hearings, and the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel is now fully staffed. EULEX will continue to support the Kosovo Judicial Council to improve its operational capabilities.

The vetting and reappointment process for Kosovo judges and prosecutors is progressing slowly and there is still a serious shortage of judges, especially for civil cases. There is also a major shortage of Kosovo prosecutors in the district courts and support staff are also in short supply. The quality and transparency of the legislative process needs to be significantly improved, to provide Kosovo with a sound legal framework and improve confidence in the legal system. Encouraged by EULEX, Kosovo courts started work on the approximately 20,000 to 22,000 compensation claims filed following the NATO intervention in 1999 and the riots in March 2004. On 26 May the Kosovo Judicial Institute organized a seminar at EULEX initiative to help judges share experiences and views on how to deal with these cases.

EULEX continued to encourage the Kosovo Judicial Council and the courts to find a common approach to a conflict of jurisdiction between the Kosovo courts and the Supreme Court special panels established to adjudicate conflict-related property claims. EULEX civil judges monitored, mentored and advised their local counterparts on property related cases at district and municipal levels, and in mixed panels adjudicated cases of inter-ethnic property disputes and fraudulent property transactions. Substantial work was done within the Kosovo Judicial Council on the Case Management Information System and on a court security and information project. EULEX judges issued advice to the Kosovo Judicial Council and courts on registration, evaluation, service of appeals and political interference. The use of the new Case Management Information System remains inadequate in many courts because of Internet connectivity problems. As the tender for Internet services should soon be finalized, the Kosovo Judicial Council is planning field visits to clarify any outstanding issues and to ensure full implementation of the system.

The Kosovo Correctional Service made progress in prison administration, operations and security management, high-risk prisoners, the escort of prisoners, and court security. Some Kosovo Serb staff members returned to Lipjan/Lipljan Prison and Detention Centre. The Kosovo Correctional Service, supported by EULEX, opened a refurbished high-risk security block in the Dubravë/a Prison; the allocation of prisoners to the new block will be closely monitored by EULEX. The Kosovo Correctional Service Commissioner approved standing operating procedures on court security and the job description for court security officers. In April, the EULEX Correctional Unit and Police, with the Kosovo Correctional Service and the Kosovo Police, conducted exercises to test joint responses to incidents at Dubravë/a Prison — the first such exercises since 2006. The Kosovo Correctional Service and EULEX carried out several security assessments at Dubravë/a Prison and Mitrovicë/a Detention Centre.

EULEX supported the establishment of a Kosovo Police Escort Unit for Extraditions. In June the Unit carried out its first mission, escorting a suspect from Hungary to Kosovo. With EULEX encouragement, the Kosovo Police and the prosecutors in most districts now routinely hold liaison meetings also with the Kosovo Correctional Service. With the support of the EULEX Correctional Unit, EULEX judges have been monitoring the work of the Conditional Release Panel, and taking part in three to four sessions per month; in each session approximately 10 to 15 cases are decided.

The Kosovo Correctional Service saw good progress on decentralization of the Kosovo Correctional Service budget, and further development of personal cash and canteen procedures in the prisons has been completed. The Kosovo Police attended a long awaited table-top exercise on command of serious incidents in Dubravë/a Prison, with several lessons learned by all stakeholders. Functional communication and collaboration has been established between Kosovo Correctional Service headquarters and Mitrovicë/a Detention Centre.

Using its executive mandate, EULEX launched investigations into high-priority cases, including fuel smuggling, money-laundering, and organized crime targets in the north of Kosovo. Several operations were launched jointly by EULEX Police and Customs with local counterparts, and by EULEX Police tasked by the Special Prosecution Office of Kosovo. Progress was made in a number of investigations by the Office, and the Kosovo authorities gave their full support to the establishment of an anti-corruption task force in the Office, to include 5 local and 3 EULEX prosecutors, 30 police inspectors, and 5 financial experts. The task force started to work in May and is expected to be fully staffed by July.

EULEX has continued its efforts to ensure the resumption of full operations at Mitrovicë/a District Court through the return of Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian judges and prosecutors. However, progress has been only partial, and thus far EULEX judges have been presiding over cases at the Courthouse. Repairs to the Courthouse, which was damaged in a minor earthquake on 10 March, were done in cooperation with the Kosovo Judicial Council.

EULEX judges continued to adjudicate criminal and civil cases. On 12 May, EULEX judges presented their annual report for 2009, an overview of the executive activities by EULEX judges in the Kosovo courts. The report is posted on the EULEX website.

On 15 June a mixed panel of one local and two EULEX judges at Pristina District Court found Albin Kurti, the leader of the Movement for Self-Determination, guilty of participating in a group obstructing official persons in performing their duties during the demonstrations of 10 February 2007. Albin Kurti was sentenced to nine months, but was released immediately in consideration of the time already spent in detention. The prosecution, represented by a local prosecutor from the Special Prosecution Office, withdrew two of three charges, participating in a crowd committing a criminal offence, and calling for resistance. The lead up to the verdict was marked by several adjournments after the defendant failed to appear in court and the Kosovo Police did not manage to act decisively to secure his presence. Other problems, including the resignation of Albin Kurti's ex officio defence lawyer, contributed to the repeated delays.

The execution of the eviction order issued by a EULEX civil judge to uphold a decision by local judges in a property dispute between the Drenusha Hunting Club and the municipality of Viti/Vitina was eventually carried out in May and the case officially closed. During the night of 6 April the disputed building was seriously damaged by an explosion just before the eviction order was due to be executed against the municipality.

Two trials for corruption were held. A EULEX judge in Prizren Municipal Court found the defendant guilty of giving bribes to a judge of Pristina District Court. The defendant was sentenced to 12 months in prison. A EULEX judge at Klinë/Klina Municipal Court (Pejë/Peć region) found a Kosovo Police officer guilty of abuse of official position or authority, and sentenced the officer to 18 months in prison, which was suspended on condition that the accused compensate the injured party.

The Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo on Kosovo Trust Agency-related Matters summoned all of the approximately 1,400 complainants in the *Employees List (Ramiz Sadiku) vs. Privatization Agency of Kosovo* case and held 32 full days of hearings. In view of the continued shortage of local judges at the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo on Kosovo Trust Agency-related Matters and a delayed selection process, the Kosovo Judicial Council on 12 April temporarily delegated a local Supreme Court judge to the Special Chamber.

The Office on Missing Persons and Forensics prepared for and conducted assessments of suspected mass grave sites in Kosovo. Similar efforts will be assisted in Montenegro and in southern Serbia. In both of the latter instances, cooperation was excellent. EULEX has asked Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to allow EULEX forensic experts to assist in the assessment of at least four potential grave sites probably containing the remains of Kosovo Albanian victims. Three field operations were conducted in the north of Kosovo.

EULEX forensic experts are assisting the Office on Missing Persons and Forensics in its aim of developing an effective and efficient strategy for the Department of Forensic Medicine, the new name and legal entity replacing the Office on Missing Persons and Forensics, and improving the delivery of professional forensic services to the judiciary and Kosovo citizens. After some delay, the Ministry of Justice began the selection process for the post of director of the Department of Forensic Medicine in early June. This delay has prevented progress on the planned reforms of the organization.

The Office on Missing Persons and Forensics conducted 32 site assessments and 12 exhumations. On 12 May the Office on Missing Persons and Forensics exhumed the remains of eight missing persons in Vushtrri/Vučitrn municipality. All in all, 23 missing persons were found between 15 March and 30 June 2010. The Office on Missing Persons and Forensics also conducted autopsies, forensic clinical examinations, death scene investigations and 23 war case autopsies. Bone samples were sent for DNA analysis for profiling; 164 DNA results were received. In 43 instances remains were handed over to families and several coordination meetings were held with family associations.

Customs

EULEX Customs monitored, mentored and advised the Kosovo Customs Service at border and boundary crossing points — with the exception of gates 1 and 31 — and at Pristina Airport. Closed-circuit television cameras at gates 1 and 31 have been operating since the end of February and transmitting live images to Kosovo Customs and EULEX. Since March EULEX has transmitted scanned (instead of photocopied) documents received at gates 1 and 31 through an automated system. The data is shared with the Kosovo Customs and the Serbian Customs Administration.

Under the lead of local institutions a series of joint actions of the Kosovo Customs, the Kosovo Police and EULEX Police and Customs took place at Pristina Airport. The actions focused on identifying potential illegal activity in relation to the import and the export of large amounts of cash. Reinforced joint police and customs law enforcement controls in the north of Kosovo were launched by EULEX with local counterparts on 19 March, consisting of enhanced checks of vehicles and cargo crossing gates 1 and 31, aimed at contributing to the rule of law and strengthening EULEX visibility. Apart from an attack on a EULEX vehicle on 13 March and some very short-lived roadblocks, the action proceeded without incident. On 5 April the operation changed to a twenty-four-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week schedule; and as of 24 April, mobile vehicle checks have been taking place on the main roads coming from gates 1 and 31.

The EULEX Customs component provided advice to Kosovo Customs and the Ministry of Finance and Economy, on, inter alia, the replacement of their data processing system, the proposed installation of communications towers at border and boundary crossing points, the implementation of the Kosovo Customs Business Intelligence system, the improvement of integrated border management implementation, and reform of the Kosovo Customs human resources system.

There has been little progress as regards the Independent Review Board, which is an appeals board for Customs decisions. The Kosovo Assembly rejected seven out of nine candidates for Board membership. On 2 July, the Kosovo authorities approved a list of new names for the Board to be proposed to the Kosovo Assembly. EULEX has urged the Kosovo authorities to complete the appointment process, handle the backlog of pending cases as a matter of urgency, and initiate inter-ministerial discussions as to the long-term reform of the Board.

The restoration of full customs control in northern Kosovo, however, remains subject to agreement between stakeholders on the collection of customs duties and the distribution of revenues.

Approved by Yves **de Kermabon**
Head of Mission

Annex II

Composition and strength of the police component of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

(as at 15 July 2010)

Country	*Number*
Germany	1
Ghana	1
Italy	1
Turkey	1
Romania	1
Pakistan	1
Total	6

Annex III

Composition and strength of the military liaison component of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

(as at 15 July 2010)

Country	Number
Denmark	1
Poland	1
Norway	1
Spain	1
Ukraine	2
Romania	1
Czech Republic	1
Total	**8**

UNMIK
July 2010
Operational boundary
International boundary
Provincial boundary
National capital
Republic capital or provincial capital
Town, village
Mountain pass
Major road
Secondary road
Railroad
0 5 10 15 20 25 km
0 5 10 15 mi
SERBIA
MONTENEGRO
ALBANIA
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
Kosovo
HQ Regional
MLT North
Kosovska Mitrovica
HQ UNMIK
HQ MLC
MLT
Priština
Skopje
UNMIK HQ
Military Liaison Component HQ
Military Liaison Team
UNMIK perimeter of operations
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

United Nations S/2010/402

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 July 2010

Original: English

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions and presidential statements concerning the situation in Sudan,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan and its determination to work with the Government of Sudan, in full respect of its sovereignty, to assist in tackling the various challenges in Sudan,

Recalling also its previous resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which reaffirm, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the United Nations World Summit outcome document, 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009) on children in armed conflict, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, and 1325 (2000) and associated resolutions on women, peace and security,

Bearing in mind the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 and its additional protocol of 16 December 1966, along with the 1969 Convention of the Organization of African Unity governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa, as well as the African Union Convention of 29 October 2009, on the Protection and Assistance of internally displaced persons in Africa,

Recalling the report on Children in Armed Conflict in Sudan dated 10 February 2009 (S/2009/84), including its recommendations, and recalling the conclusions endorsed by the Security Council Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict in Sudan (S/AC.51/2009/5),

Expressing its strong commitment and determination to promote and support the Darfur political process, and the efforts of the Joint Chief Mediator (JCM), *welcoming* his commitment to progress and the negotiations between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) on an agreement under the auspices of the JCM, and *deploring* the fact that some groups continue to refuse to join the political process,

Underlining, without prejudice to the Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the importance of the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union (AU), consistent with

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Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, with regard to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, particularly in Sudan,

Welcoming the important role of AU in Sudan, in particular the efforts of the AU High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, working in cooperation with the Joint Chief Mediator and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to promote peace, reconciliation and accountability in Darfur, including through the early convening of a Darfur-Darfur conference, with a view to encouraging early progress in the AU-UN led peace process,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 14 July (S/2010/382) on UNAMID,

Stressing the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments, with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions; *underlining*, in this regard, the importance of addressing the requirement for UNAMID to be able to deter threats to the implementation of its mandate, and the safety and security of its peacekeeping personnel in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing deep concern at the deterioration in the security situation in Darfur, including ceasefire violations, attacks by rebel groups, aerial bombardment by the Government of Sudan, increased inter-tribal fighting, and attacks on humanitarian personnel and peacekeepers, which have restricted humanitarian access to conflict areas where vulnerable civilian populations reside, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General, and *calling* on all parties to cease hostilities and urgently facilitate humanitarian access,

Reiterating its condemnation of all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Darfur, *calling* on all parties to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law, *emphasizing* the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of such crimes and *urging* the Government of Sudan to comply with its obligations in this respect,

Reaffirming its concern over the negative affect of the ongoing violence in Darfur on the stability of Sudan as a whole as well as the region, *welcoming* improved relations between Sudan and Chad following the signature on 15 January 2010 by the Government of Sudan and the Government of Chad of an agreement to normalize their bilateral relations as well as the deployment of a joint force under a joint command along the border, and *encouraging* Sudan and Chad to continue to implement this agreement and to cooperate in order to achieve peace and stability in Darfur and the wider region,

Determining that the situation in Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNAMID as set out in resolution 1769 (2007) for a further 12 months to 31 July 2011;

2. *Underlines* the need for UNAMID to make full use of its mandate and capabilities, giving priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources to (a) the protection of civilians across Darfur, and (b) ensuring safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access, the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and humanitarian activities;

3. *Reaffirms* the importance of promoting the AU-UN led political process for Darfur, and in this regard, *underlines* the need for the systematic and sustained engagement of all Darfurian stakeholders, including newly elected officials, civil society, including women and women-led organizations, community groups and tribal leaders, in order to create a conducive environment for peace and security through constructive and open dialogue, *welcomes* the priority given to UNAMID's continuing efforts to promote such engagement in support of and to complement the work of the Joint Chief Mediator Mr. Djibrill Yipene Bassole and the AU-UN led political process for Darfur; and *welcomes* the work of the AU High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan in this regard;

4. *Requests* UNAMID in consultation with the UN Country Team to develop a comprehensive strategy for the achievement of the objectives set out in paragraph 2 above and *requests* UNAMID to maximize the use of its capabilities in Darfur, in the implementation of that strategy;

5. *Commends* the contribution of troop and police contributing countries and donors to UNAMID *notes that* UNAMID is nearing full deployment; *underlines* the need for capable units able to carry out UNAMID's mandated tasks, in this regard, *requests* the continuing assistance of donors to troop and police contributing countries in ensuring units are suitably trained and equipped to conduct and sustain themselves on operations and *calls* on Member States to pledge and contribute the remaining military utility helicopters, aerial reconnaissance, and other force enablers required;

6. *Strongly condemns* all attacks on UNAMID; *underlines* that any attack or threat on UNAMID is unacceptable; *demands* that there be no recurrence of such attacks, *stresses* the need to enhance the safety and security of UNAMID personnel, as well as the need to bring an end to impunity for those who attack peacekeepers, and in this regard *urges* the Government of Sudan to do its utmost to bring the perpetrators of any such crimes to justice;

7. *Commends* the credible work of the Tripartite Mechanism but *expresses deep concern* at continuing restrictions placed upon UNAMID movement and operations; *calls on* all parties in Darfur to remove all obstacles to UNAMID's full and proper discharge of its mandate, including by ensuring its security and freedom of movement; and in this regard, *urges* the Government of Sudan to comply with the Status of Forces Agreement fully and without delay, particularly regarding flight and equipment clearances, and the removal of all obstacles to the use of UNAMID aerial assets in order to, inter alia, respond to armed threats and emergency medical evacuations as appropriate;

8. *Stresses* the importance of achievable and realistic targets against which the progress of United Nations peacekeeping operations can be measured; *requests* the Secretary-General to continue reporting to the Council every 90 days on progress made towards implementing UNAMID's mandate across Darfur, including on progress towards and obstacles to the implementation of the strategy referred to in paragraph 4 above, also including an assessment of progress against the benchmarks set out in Annex II of the report of the Secretary-General of 16 November 2009 as well as on progress on the political process, the security and humanitarian situation, including in the IDP sites and refugee camps, and early recovery and all parties compliance with their international obligations;

9. *Demands* that all parties to the conflict in Darfur immediately end violence, attacks on civilians, peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel, and comply with their obligations under human rights and international humanitarian law; *affirms*, in this context, the Council's strong opposition to serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law; *calls* for an immediate cessation of hostilities and for all parties to commit themselves to a sustained and permanent ceasefire; *requests* the Secretary-General to consult with relevant parties with a view to developing a more effective ceasefire monitoring mechanism; and *underlines* the need for UNAMID to report on major instances of violence which undermines the parties' full and constructive efforts towards peace;

10. *Expresses* its serious concern at the deterioration of the humanitarian situation, the continued threats to humanitarian organizations, and the restricted humanitarian access in Darfur, *calls* for the full implementation of the Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur; and *demands* that the Government of Sudan, all militias armed groups and all other stakeholders ensure the full, safe and unhindered access of humanitarian organizations and relief personnel and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in need;

11. *Reiterates* that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur and that an inclusive political settlement and the successful deployment of UNAMID are essential to re-establishing peace; *reaffirms* its full support for the work of Joint Chief Mediator Mr. Djibrill Yipené Bassolé and the AU/UN led political process for Darfur;

12. *Demands* that all parties to the conflict, including all rebel groups, immediately engage fully and constructively in the peace process without preconditions, including by entering into talks under the mediation of Mr. Bassolé with a view to completing an inclusive and comprehensive agreement, underlines the importance of completing such an agreement in order to bring a stable and durable peace to the region *welcomes* the work of Qatar in this regard and the support of other countries in the region; *calls* on UNAMID to continue to support the Joint Chief Mediator and the Joint Mediation Team;

13. *Notes* that conflict in one area of Sudan affects other areas of Sudan and the wider region; and *urges* UNAMID to coordinate closely with other United Nations' missions in the region, including the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT);

14. *Requests* UNAMID, consistent with its current capabilities and mandate, to assist and complement UNMIS' efforts, as appropriate, in preparing for the referenda in Southern Sudan and Abyei, including coordinating closely with UNMIS in sharing analysis of risks in the border areas, particularly regarding threats to civilians;

15. *Stresses* the importance of achieving dignified and durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons, and of ensuring their full participation in the planning and management of these solutions, *demands* that all parties to the conflict in Darfur create the conditions conducive to allowing the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons or their local integration;

16. *Notes* that security will greatly facilitate early recovery initiatives and a return to normalcy in Darfur; *stresses* the importance of early recovery efforts in Darfur, and in this respect *encourages* UNAMID, within its current mandate, to facilitate the work of the UN Country Team and expert agencies on early recovery and reconstruction in Darfur, inter alia through the provision of area security; and *calls on* the Government of Sudan to continue its efforts to resolve the root causes of the Darfur crisis and to increase investment in early recovery activity;

17. *Expresses deep concern* over the persistent localized conflicts and violence and their effect on civilians, and the proliferation of arms, in particular small arms, and, in this regard, *requests* UNAMID to continue to support local conflict resolution mechanisms and to monitor whether any arms or related material are present in Darfur in accordance with its mandate as set out in paragraph 9 of resolution 1769;

18. *Demands* that the parties to the conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and children, from all forms of sexual violence, in line with resolution 1820 (2008); and *requests* UNAMID "to report on the implementation of its comprehensive strategy for providing protection to women and children from sexual violence and gender based violence, as well as to assess progress towards the elimination of sexual and gender-based violence, *requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that the relevant provisions of resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1889 (2009) are implemented by UNAMID and to include information on this in his reporting to the Council;

19. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure (a) continued monitoring and reporting, as part of the reports referred to in paragraph 8 above, of the situation of children and (b) continued dialogue with the parties to the conflict towards the preparation of time bound action plans to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers and other violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law against children;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General periodically to review and update the concept of operations and rules of engagement of UNAMID in line with the mission's mandate under relevant Security Council resolutions and to report, as part of the reports referred to in paragraph 8 above, on this to the Security Council and troop-contributing countries;

21. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2010/401

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 July 2010

Original: English

Note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations presents its compliments to the President of the Security Council for the month of July 2010 and has the honour to submit herewith a letter dated 25 July 2010 addressed to You from H.E. Mr. Hoshyar Zebari, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning Iraq's compliance regarding disarmament issues (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of Iraq also has the honour to request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

10-46698 (E) 020810 020810

Annex to the note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 18 January 2010 to the President of the Security Council outlining the steps being taken by the Government of Iraq to comply with its disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. In presidential statement S/PRST/2010/5, the Security Council welcomed that letter and requested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to evaluate the quality of Iraq's cooperation with the Agency. The Director General of IAEA commended Iraq's "excellent cooperation" in his response to that request (S/2010/190). Our letter of 18 January 2010 also stated that Iraq would inform the Security Council and IAEA of other steps demonstrating Iraq's commitment to the principles of disarmament and non-proliferation.

In the present letter, I should like to draw attention to additional steps taken by the Government of Iraq in that regard. As you are aware, in my letter dated 17 February 2010 addressed to the Director General of IAEA, I noted Iraq has been voluntarily applying the requirements of the protocol additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded with IAEA. On 16 July 2010, Iraq officially submitted its notification to the Agency in accordance with the Additional Protocol, article 17. Furthermore, on 13 July 2010, the Government of Iraq decided to accede to the Hague Code of Conduct, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is taking the necessary administrative procedures in that regard. In addition to the foregoing, on 29 July 2010, Iraq submitted its first report to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on the dismantling of the chemical weapons programme inherited from the previous regime. Having successfully completed these important steps, we feel that the time has come to lift the outstanding restrictions pertaining to disarmament imposed on Iraq by Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). Continued implementation of those resolutions deprives the Iraqi people and Iraq, as a responsible and active member of the international community, of the right to benefit from scientific and technological progress.

Accordingly, we trust that the Security Council will adopt, at the earliest opportunity, a resolution ordering the lifting of those restrictions, thereby affirming the Council's credibility and the transparency of its relations with Member States. There is nothing to prevent the Council from adopting such a resolution in view of the significant strides that Iraq has made in disarmament and non-proliferation.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter to the members of the Security Council as soon as possible.

(*Signed*) Hoshyar **Zebari**
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republic of Iraq

United Nations S/2010/401

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 July 2010

Original: English

Note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and has the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 28 July 2010, addressed to you from H.E. Mr. Hoshyar Zebari, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq regarding the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (see annex).

10-46764 (E) 020810 020810

Please recycle

Annex to the note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

I have the honour to convey to you the wish of my Government that the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) should be extended for a further period of 12 months, in keeping with Security Council resolutions 1500 (2003), 1546 (2004), 1557 (2004), 1619 (2005), 1700 (2006), 1770 (2007), 1830 (2008) and 1883 (2009).

Over the past year, violence has declined markedly. Despite a number of terrorist acts targeting innocent civilians, the security situation in Iraq has improved significantly. The agreement providing for the withdrawal of United States troops and regularizing their temporary presence is being implemented. The Iraqi security forces are fully assuming their responsibilities, despite challenges in some areas. They have, without a doubt, proved their ability to maintain security throughout Iraq, inflicting debilitating and lethal blows against terrorist forces and upholding the law without regard for party, ethnic or sectarian considerations.

Legislative elections were held on 7 March 2010 and elicited considerable Arab, regional and international interest. The Mission and the observers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the international community and civil society organizations all expressed their conviction that the elections, which helped to consolidate democracy in Iraq, had been transparent and fair. The announcement of the results was delayed by the constitutionally mandated certification procedure, which entailed a recount in accordance with electoral regulations.

The political blocs are working to form, as soon as possible, a strong and effective Government based on the Constitution and the law, representing all components of Iraqi society.

The improvement in the security situation has encouraged many Arab and other countries to reopen their missions in Iraq, thereby enhancing the country's regional and international relations. That trend has been further encouraged by the appointment of 35 Iraqi ambassadors around the world, demonstrating Iraq's endeavour to become an effective and responsible member of the international community.

The Government of Iraq values the advice, support and assistance of UNAMI, and looks forward to a more positive, effective and constructive role for the Mission with the return to work in Iraq of the specialized agencies, funds and programmes and their direct and valuable contribution to its reconstruction.

The elected constitutional Government of Iraq, while reiterating its wish that the mandate should be extended, hopes that the provision of assistance will be in accordance with specific mechanisms and with the prior approval of the Government of Iraq, in the manner referred to in my letter dated 6 August 2007.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(*Signed*) Hoshyar **Zebari**
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republic of Iraq

United Nations A/64/877–S/2010/405

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
29 July 2010
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 15
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Identical letters dated 22 July 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations committed during the month of April 2010 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 15, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziade**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

10-46790 (E) 120810 120810

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 22 July 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Israeli violations, acts of aggression and other activities during the month of April 2010

Date	Time	Ground violations
6 April 2010	1035 hours	Opposite the village of Hula, between the Manarah area and Abbad, unarmed Israeli enemy military personnel crossed three metres over the technical fence without violating the Blue Line.
13 April 2010	0645 hours	An Israeli enemy patrol took up combat positions while an enemy bulldozer crossed the technical fence and levelled land for the purpose of laying a barbed wire strip. The bulldozer and the enemy patrol left at 0915 hours.
	1035 hours	Members of an Israeli enemy patrol observed Lebanese Army personnel conducting excavations and laying fortifications at the Ra's al-Naqurah position.
16 April 2010	1155 hours	Two Israeli enemy personnel took down two Lebanese flags in the Abbasiyah area.
	2040 hours	An Israeli enemy patrol directed a searchlight for 20 minute towards Lebanese territory opposite the Lebanese Army position at Mays al-Jabal.
17 April 2010	1140 hours	Members of an Israeli enemy patrol observed Lebanese Army personnel conducting excavations at the Ra's al-Naqurah position.
	2130 hours	The Israeli enemy fired a flare shell over Lebanese territory between the towns of Kafr Kila and Udaysah. It landed in Udaysah.
21 April 2010	1100 hours	The Israeli enemy strafed the perimeter of the Radar position on the outskirts of Kafr Shuba) inside the occupied Shab'a Farms with light and medium automatic-weapons.
	2345 hours	From its position at coordinates *ghayn*-8 (Labunah-Jabal al-Mishqaf 2), the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for five seconds over the Lebanese Army position at Labunah, moving the beam in a circular pattern.
23 April 2010	0910 hours	Opposite the town of Aytarun, Israeli enemy personnel crossed the technical fence, without violating the Blue Line, and performed maintenance on a solar energy panel connected to a pole-mounted camera.
25 April 2010	1035 hours	Israeli enemy forces interfered with the military landline telephone network in order to send recorded messages in Arabic offering a reward of $1.3 million to anyone with information on the Israeli soldiers who disappeared during the battle of Sultan Ya'qub.
	1320 hours	Israeli enemy civilian personnel photographed the Lebanese Army position at Kafr Kila.
28 April 2010	2120 hours	An Israeli enemy patrol directed a searchlight for 25 seconds towards the dirt road between the Lebanese Army positions at Ghaba'in and Dahirah.

Date	Time	Sea violations
6 April 2010	0450 hours	An Israeli enemy military launch fired a projectile in order to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was within Lebanese territorial waters.
18 April 2010	2215 hours	The Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for one minute from its position at Ra's al-Naqurah towards Lebanese territorial waters.

Date	Time	Air violations
1 April 2010	0653 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0703 hours.
	0801 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1050 hours.
	1109 hours	Four Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the South. They left at 1111 hours.
	1316 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1635 hours.
	1520 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1543 hours.
	1530 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1800 hours.
	1557 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1805 hours.
2 April 2010	0510 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0526 hours.
	0513 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1830 hours.
4 April 2010	1128 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1410 hours.
5 April 2010	0700 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0934 hours.
	0749 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 2010 hours.
6 April 2010	0625 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0630 hours.
	0702 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1619 hours.
7 April 2010	0100 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0130 hours.
	0245 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0250 hours.
	0449 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1050 hours.

Date	Time	Violations
	0510 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0520 hours.
	0551 hours	Two Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1510 hours.
	2015 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering from the North and heading south. They circled over Labunah before leaving at 2016 hours.
	2030 hours	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over Ra's al-Naqurah before leaving at 2033 hours.
8 April 2010	0713 hours	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1141 hours.
	0718 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b and heading north. It circled over the South before leaving at 1820 hours over Naqurah.
	0720 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0730 hours.
	0809 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1801 hours.
	1000 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1156 hours.
	1010 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1020 hours.
	1103 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1208 hours.
	1517 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1543 hours.
9 April 2010	0813 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1845 hours.
	0827 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0841 hours.
	0828 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, its suburbs and the South before leaving at 1840 hours over Naqurah.
	0951 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1833 hours.
	1109 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1128 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Air violations*
	1217 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1249 hours.
10 April 2010	1058 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1101 hours.
11 April 2010	0320 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0349 hours.
	1210 hours	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving after 30 seconds.
12 April 2010	0837 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1015 hours.
	1017 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1025 hours.
13 April 2010	0951 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0954 hours.
	1057 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1107 hours.
	1300 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1345 hours.
	1306 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1415 hours.
	1315 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1330 hours.
	1423 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1500 hours.
	2020 hours	Two Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 2100 hours.
	2112 hours	Two Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 2129 hours.
14 April 2010	0655 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1017 hours.
	0700 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and heading north. It circled over the South and the Bekaa before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	1043 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1245 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Air violations*
	1044 hours	Six Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Kila and heading north. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1058 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1101 hours.
	1105 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1115 hours.
	1131 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1136 hours.
	1155 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1157 hours.
	1250 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1251 hours.
	1400 hours	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1410 hours.
	1444 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1450 hours.
	1954 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1958 hours.
15 April 2010	0024 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0059 hours.
	0223 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0400 hours.
	0654 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1034 hours.
	1017 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1020 hours.
	1020 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1028 hours.
	1021 hours	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1028 hours.
	1021 hours	Six Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace as follows: two entered over Naqurah, two over Alma al-Sha'b and two over Kafr Kila. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1120 hours over Ramaysh.
	1022 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1029 hours.

Date	Time	Air violations
	1023 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1215 hours.
	1030 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1035 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1048 hours.
	1048 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1049 hours.
	1054 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1121 hours.
	1130 hours	Three Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1205 hours.
	1140 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1145 hours.
	1145 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1150 hours.
	1150 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1155 hours.
	1155 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1200 hours.
	1202 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1621 hours.
	1446 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1543 hours.
	1740 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1800 hours.
	1746 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1750 hours.
	1810 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1818 hours.
	1835 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1850 hours.
	1847 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1858 hours.

Date	Time	Air violations
16 April 2010	0700 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1243 hours.
	0706 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1410 hours.
	0710 hours	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and heading north as far as Tyre. It circled over the South before leaving at 1250 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0730 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1754 hours.
	0901 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1410 hours.
17 April 2010	0812 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0905 hours.
	0815 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1600 hours.
	0825 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and heading north as far as Beirut. It circled over Beirut and Ba'abda, and then returned south and circled over the southern regions, before leaving at 1835 hours over Naqurah.
	0828 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0842 hours.
	0926 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1834 hours.
	0948 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1838 hours.
	1209 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1444 hours.
18 April 2010	0650 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1500 hours over Rumaysh.
	0655 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the Bekaa before leaving at 0711 hours.
	0846 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0915 hours.
	0901 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0315 hours.
	0933 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 2053 hours.

Date	Time	Air violations
	0940 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0420 hours on 19 April 2010 over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1030 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Kila. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1031 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1113 hours.
	1116 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1630 hours.
	1210 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1358 hours.
	1639 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1705 hours.
	1725 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1740 hours.
	2307 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 2359 hours.
19 April 2010	0001 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0406 hours.
	0815 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and heading north. It circled over the South before leaving at 1825 hours over Naqurah.
	0820 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1822 hours.
	1046 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1434 hours.
	0940 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1107 hours.
20 April 2010	0650 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1353 hours.
	0655 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and heading north as far as Jazzin. It circled over the South before leaving at 1345 hours over Naqurah.
	0659 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1346 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Air violations*
	0747 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1508 hours.
	1528 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1532 hours.
	1553 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1555 hours.
	1621 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1625 hours.
	2030 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 2040 hours.
	2300 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 2310 hours.
22 April 2010	1036 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1133 hours.
	1028 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1043 hours.
	2024 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 2028 hours.
	2035 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 2040 hours.
23 April 2010	0605 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah some three miles from the coast and heading north. It circled over Beirut and the South before leaving at 1840 hours over Naqurah.
	0900 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1835 hours.
	1016 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1833 hours.
	1230 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1819 hours.
	1246 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1833 hours.
	2308 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 1055 hours on 24 April 2010 over Naqurah.
	2310 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 2329 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Air violations*
24 April 2010	0547 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1051 hours.
	0608 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0635 hours.
	0610 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0612 hours.
	0630 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 0633 hours.
	0700 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 0703 hours.
	0740 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 0743 hours.
	1024 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1433 hours.
	2000 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Tyre. It circled over the sea between Tyre and Sarafand before leaving at 2325 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	2306 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 2359 hours.
25 April 2010	0650 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1530 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	0657 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1511 hours.
	0726 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0731 hours.
	0732 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0749 hours.
	0735 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and heading north as far as Riyaq-Baalbek. It circled over the Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0350 hours on 26 April 2010 over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0745 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1258 hours.
	1125 hours	Two Israeli enemy warpllanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1245 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Air violations*
	1143 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1144 hours.
	1148 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1155 hours.
	1150 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1152 hours.
	1219 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1224 hours.
	1222 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1224 hours.
	1446 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1515 hours.
	1639 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0600 hours on 26 April 2010.
26 April 2010	0001 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0223 hours.
	0628 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0745 hours.
	0654 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0740 hours.
	0742 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0750 hours.
	1028 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1215 hours.
	1030 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Kila and heading north as far as Tripoli. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1220 hours over Rumaysh.
	1045 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1058 hours.
	1122 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1134 hours.
	1135 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1140 hours.
	1344 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1810 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Air violations*
	1900 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 2359 hours.
	1905 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1450 hours on 27 April 2010 over Naqurah.
	2000 hours	Five Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 2025 hours.
27 April 2010	0001 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0027 hours.
	0456 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0457 hours.
	0855 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1211 hours.
	1050 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1100 hours.
	1320 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1340 hours.
	1355 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1832 hours.
	1928 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 2315 hours.
	2005 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 2010 hours.
	2048 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 2359 hours.
28 April 2010	0221 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0948 hours.
	0710 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1220 hours.
	1020 hours	Two Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1035 hours.
	1025 hours	Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1045 hours.
	1027 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1046 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Air violations*
	1040 hours	Two Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1140 hours.
	1136 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 1138 hours.
	1525 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1619 hours.
	1526 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1650 hours.
	1550 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1755 hours.
	1608 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1830 hours.
	1626 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1649 hours.
	2043 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace flying north. It circled on Ra's al-Naqurah before leaving after 30 seconds.
29 April 2010	0817 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0828 hours.
	0935 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1833 hours.
	1225 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1245 hours.
	1333 hours	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1340 hours.
	1917 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1918 hours.
	1928 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1929 hours.
30 April 2010	0810 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 1000 hours.
	0815 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Kila. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1010 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0840 hours	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the South before leaving at 0841 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Air violations*
	0909 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 0910 hours.
	0949 hours	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the South before leaving at 0950 hours.
	1050 hours	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over Ra's al-Naqurah before leaving at 1053 hours.
	1110 hours	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over Ra's al-Naqurah before leaving at 1115 hours.